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In times past, many-perhaps most-wars had their origin in religious controversies. If today such [religions] as Arianism, Manichaeanism, Monophysitism, and Iconoclasm no longer rend empires, religious schismaticism remains prevalent, and religious
disputes, unique in the passions and ideologicalfurors they generate, offer afertile source of civil conflict.'
I. INTRODUCTION

A priest, a rabbi, and an imam walk into a contract lawyer's
office. Fortunately, this is not the opening of a lawyer joke, but it
might well be the prelude to a complicated constitutional question
about the interaction of the First Amendment and contract law.
Pastors, priests, rabbis, imams, religious schools, churches, religious businesses, and a wealth of faith-based groups all enter into
contractual agreements. Not surprisingly, these agreements often
contain religious language, and sometimes they even hinge on provisions invoking expressly religious concepts.2 Religious documents come in a variety of forms, including marriage contracts, 3
disposition of property documents, 4 agreements on a child's reli-

1. Note, JudicialIntervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1142, 1142 (1962) (footnote omitted).
See Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 141 F. App'x 263, 274 (5th
2.
Cir. 2005) (noting that "[t]he parties thus evinced a clear desire to incorporate
biblical provisions into their everyday employment dealings"); Michael C.
Grossman, Note, Is This Arbitration?:Religious Tribunals,JudicialReview, and
Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 169, 188-89 (2007) (noting that some religious arbitration agreements are "governed by religious law, can contain terms
subject to dispute among religious authorities, and can also include statements of
faith" (footnotes omitted)).
3. E.g., Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983) (addressing a
Jewish marriage contract).
4. E.g., First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian
Church, 464 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1984) (addressing a church property dispute).
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5
-6
gious upbringing,
commercial
transactions, employment con7
tracts, and arbitration agreements. In some states, these agreements have even been the subject of legislation. 9 In sum, religious

5. E.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (plurality) (addressing an oral agreement to raise the children in the Jewish faith in
the context of an order forbidding the father taking the children to non-Jewish
religious services); Rebecca Korzec, A Tale of Two Religions: A Contractual
Approach to Religion as a Factorin Child Custody and Visitation Disputes, 25
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1121 (1991).

6. E.g., Nat'l Grp. for Commc'ns & Computers Ltd. v. Lucent Techs.
Int'l Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. 2004) (addressing a choice of law provision that set Saudi Arabia's divine law as applicable); Menorah Chapels at Millburn v. Needle, 899 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (contract for a
funeral and specific Jewish rituals); Rende & Esposito Consultants, Inc. v. St.
Augustine's Roman Catholic Church, 516 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(addressing a church property and commercial contract dispute).
7. E.g., Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d
648 (10th Cir. 2002) (addressing church employment and sexual harassment
case); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (addressing a termination
under an employment contract requiring adherence to religious laws); Basinger
v. Pilarczyk, 707 N.E.2d 1149 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (addressing a breach of
contract claim brought by former school teachers).
8.
E.g., Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 141 F. App'x 263 (5th Cir.
2005); Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Colo.
1999) (addressing a commercial arbitration agreement requiring a type of arbitration called Christian Conciliation); Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2002) (addressing the claim that an agreement to resolve disputes
using regulations arising from thirteenth century synods was an agreement to
arbitrate disputes before a Jewish beth din); cf Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161,
1168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting a case not raising
Establishment Clause issues but rather a Christian Conciliation agreement addressing marital dissolution, child custody, and arbitration, among other matters).
9. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236(B)(5)(h), 236(B(6)(d) (McKinney
2010) (instructing a court to, when appropriate, consider any "barrier to remarriage," including religious barriers, in equitable distribution proceedings); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 253(2) (McKinney 2010) (requiring parties to allege when
seeking dissolution of a marriage that he or she has or will take "all steps solely
within his or her power to remove any barrier to the defendant's remarriage").
These statutes respond to problems that arise under Jewish law in particular
divorce situations. This general issue is discussed further in this Article, but the
statutes themselves are beyond its scope.
For discussion of these statutes see Ilene H. Barshay, The Implications of the Constitution'sReligion Clauses on New York Family Law, 40 How.
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parties sometimes draft religious documents, and they do so in a
variety of contexts. The infusion of potentially sacred obligations
into the realm of secular contract law presents courts with a number of difficult questions.
For example, although courts are charged to interpret and
give effect to religious documents whenever possible,' 0 the judiciary is starkly constrained by the religion clauses of the First
Amendment, especially the Establishment Clause." The conflicting commands to enforce contracts and yet to uphold the limitations of the Establishment Clause are not easily reconciled. What
is a court to do when an agreement specifies that "the law of Moses and Israel" governs,1 2 states that disputes are to be referred to a

L.J. 205, 230-35 (1996) (arguing that these statutes are likely unconstitutional);
Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 781,
822-36 (1998) (concluding that "statutes designed to induce husbands to go
through Jewish divorces do present serious constitutional issues, but the basic
features of those statutes should be accepted"); Lawrence M. Warmflash, The
New York Approach to Enforcing Religious Marriage Contracts: From Avitzur
to the Get Statute, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 229, 250-53 (1984) (arguing that section
253 of the New York Domestic Relations Law is unconstitutional); Jill Wexler,
Note, Gotta Get a Get: Maryland and Florida Should Adopt Get Statutes, 17
J.L. & POL'Y 735 (2009) (discussing these statutes and similar ones proposed in
other states).
10. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871) ("Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations
for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract,
are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members
subject to its restraints."). In addition to this command by the Supreme Court,
the parties charge courts with assisting them as well. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman,
Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1378, 1382 (1981) ("Internal religious disputes ... unlike other
religion cases, do not involve a meddlesome government gratuitously inserting
itself into church affairs. They are requests by one faction of the churchsometimes by both factions-that the court act as referee." (footnote omitted)).
See discussion infra Part III.
11.
Compare In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (111.
12.
App. Ct. 1990) (upholding the enforcement of a Jewish marriage contract that
provided that the "law of Moses and Israel" governed the marriage), with Aflalo
v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (declining to enforce a
Jewish marriage contract as violative of the First Amendment).
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"Christian Conciliation Service" for resolution, 13 or requires a husband to pay a dowry arising from obligations set out in the
Qur'an?1 4 How does a court interpret or enforce contractual terms
that invoke religious matters?
This Article takes direct aim at these questions by explaining the relevant Establishment Clause limitations, analyzing the
governing case law from around the nation, and outlining a proposed model for judicial analysis of all religious documents. It
also reviews a wide variety of guidance helpfully offered by other
commentators in these areas. Part II sets the stage by highlighting
some of the cultural and religious factors that often surround religious documents, taking as an example marriage contracts. Part III
illuminates the fact that it will at times be impossible, from a constitutional standpoint, to enforce religious agreements under governing case law. Part IV then discusses state and federal court
decisions that have addressed religious documents. Next, Part V
draws from existing literature from other commentators on interpreting religious agreements and begins to frame an analytical
model. Finally, Part VI proposes a model for courts to follow in
adjudicating religious document cases.
From the outset, it is clear that there is no easy answer to
the problems that religious documents can present. When faced
with a religious controversy, courts can allow some inquiry into
religious matters, or alternatively, they can foreclose inquiry completely. Despite the constitutional concerns that potentially arise,
this Article argues strongly against the latter option. The Establishment Clause permits limited inquiries into religious practices,
13.
See, e.g., Glenn G. Waddell & Judith M. Keegan, ChristianConciliation: An Alternative to "Ordinary"ADR, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 583 (1999) (discussing and citing cases involving a dispute resolution format called "Christian Conciliation"). "Christian Conciliation" may be defined as "'a process for reconciling people and resolving disputes out of court in a biblical manner."' Id. at 590
(quoting INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, GUIDELINES FOR CHRISTIAN
CONCILIATION 1 (rev. 3.8 1989)); see also Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch.,
141 F. App'x 263, 274 (5th Cir. 2005) (discussing employment contract requiring all differences to be resolved according to biblical principles).
14.
Compare Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
(upholding an Islamic marriage contract requiring payment of a mahr), with
Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
July 10, 1995) (declining to uphold Islamic marriage contract requiring payment
of a mahr because it failed to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds).
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and thus, courts should not broadly dismiss oversight of religious
document cases. Rather, by following the model proposed herein,
courts can attempt to honor the expectations of the contracting parties within the limits established by the Constitution. Moreover,
while much of the analysis and discussion in this Article focuses
specifically on religious contracts under the Establishment Clause,
the model proposed in this Article is aimed at addressing any type
of document containing religious terms.
II. THE PARTIES: RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL FACTORS
SURROUNDING ISLAMIC AND JEWISH MARRIAGE CONTRACTS

As already suggested, interpreting documents containing
religious language raises a variety of difficult constitutional questions. Courts and commentators alike have struggled to answer
these questions, and no uniform answers have yet emerged. Part of
the complexity sometimes stems from cultural and religious expectations surrounding the agreement at issue, and the extent to which
the agreement can be interpreted and enforced is often related to
those atmospheric details.1 5 Accordingly, this Part provides an
example of such details and examines common religious and cultural factors surrounding marriage contracts-a category of religious documents that has repeatedly found its way into secular
courts. 16

Because Islam and Judaism regard marriage as a contractual arrangement, both religions have a strong history of marriage

Many courts and commentators have observed that unfortunate con15.
sequences sometimes relate to non-enforcement of religious marriage contracts.
See Barshay, supra note 9, at 213-15; Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract,and the FirstAmendment, 51 MD. L. REV.
312 (1992); Warmflash, supra note 9, at 250-53; Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note,
Islamic MarriageContracts in American Courts: Interpreting Mahr Agreements
as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 189
(2002); Tracie Rogalin Siddiqui, Interpretationof Islamic Marriage Contracts
by American Courts, 41 FAM. L.Q. 639 (2007); Wexler, supra note 9.
16.
The scholarly discussion surrounding Jewish and Islamic marriage
contracts has been quite extensive. See generally Barshay, supra note 9, at 21315; Breitowitz, supra note 15; Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 192-202; Siddiqui,
supranote 15.
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contracts. In Judaism, when couples marry, they often agree to a
document called a ketubah, which typically contains a number of
various promises.' 8 Similarly, marrying Muslim couples often sign
a religious document called a nikah, which itself evidences an assortment of terms and promises.19 These documents-a ketubah
and a nikah-can resemble secular contracts in many respects, and
the language of a traditional ketubah or nikah often contains promises that resemble contractual exchanges. For example, a traditional nikah contains a mahr, a promise by the husband to pay a
certain amount to a wife upon marriage and to pay an additional
amount upon divorce if the divorce occurs for specified reasons.20
Similarly, a ketubah might provide that a husband and wife will
abide by "the law of Moses and Israel" during the marriage.21 This
promise to adhere to the law of Moses and Israel can have specific
meaning for some Jewish couples, including how a divorce is to be
handled.2 2
A ketubah could also contain an agreement to appear before a beth din in the event of any disputes. 23 A beth din is "a rabbinical tribunal commonly comprised of three rabbis, or one rabbi
and two lay persons, assembled to decide matters of Jewish law or
17.
Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 359, 361 (1999) (citing
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Kiddushin at 2a); Emily L. Thompson & F. Soniya Yu-

nus, Note, Choice of Laws or Choice of Culture:How Western Nations Treat the
Islamic Marriage Contract in Domestic Courts, 25 Wis. INT'L L.J. 361, 363
(2007) (citing ALAMGIR MUHAMMAD SERAJUDDIN, SHARI'A LAW AND SOCIETY:

TRADITION AND CHANGE INSOUTH ASIA 195 (2001)).
18.
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 432 (1st ed. 1971); 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA

JUDAICA 840 (1st ed. 1971); see generally Jennifer A. Hardin, Note, Religious
PostmaritalDispute Resolution: Jewish MarriageContracts and Civil Courts, 4
OHIO. ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 97, 97-101 (1988) (discussing Jewish marriage

contracts).
19.
See, e.g., Siddiqui, supra note 15, at 642.
20.
Id. at 642-45.
21.
See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (addressing a ketubah involving this language); Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446
N.E.2d 136, 140 (N.Y. 1983).
22.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1018-19 (discussing a Jewish wife's alleged expectations under a ketubah).
23.
See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 137 (considering a ketubah containing a
provision recognizing a beth din); Greenawalt,supra note 9, at 816 (discussing a
draft version of a ketubah containing such a provision).

The University of Memphis Law Review

8

Vol. 42

resolve disputes." 24 Thus, an agreement in a ketubah to appear
before a beth din could be regarded as an arbitration clause. All of
these provisions-a mahr provision, the promise in a ketubah to
follow the law of Moses and Israel, and any provisions recognizing
a beth din-could have relevance if the parties seek a divorce.
A divorce in both Islam and Judaism invokes specific and
important religious consequences. In Judaism, for instance, the
marriage is not regarded as dissolved religiously even after a civil
divorce by a secular court.25 The marriage continues to exist under
Jewish law until the husband gives and the wife accepts a religious
divorce called a get.26 Until then, any future romantic relationships
that the ex-husband and ex-wife engage in are considered extramarital.2 7 For the ex-wife without a get, this result is particularly
problematic. If the ex-husband engages in future romantic relationships, he will be considered to have engaged in polygamy, 28
but if the ex-wife becomes romantically involved again, she will be
considered to have engaged in adultery. 29 In fact, because the exwife has not been given a get, she is deemed an agunah ("chained
woman") 30 and may not marry again in the eyes of her religion.31
If she does marry again, any children born of that marriage will be
considered mamzerim, to have been born from an "incestuous or
adulterous relationship," and they will be prohibited from marrying
Jews other than fellow mamzerim.3 2 Thus, the consequences for a
wife whose husband will not give her a get are substantial, longlasting, and generally more burdensome than the consequences for
the husband. In Islam, the consequences of divorce can be similar24.
25.

Breitowitz, supra note 15, at 326.
See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 17, at 361

BREITOWITZ,

BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS

(citing IRVING

LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE

AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 5-6 (1993)).

26. Id.
Greenawalt, supranote 9, at 810-11.
27.
28.
Id. at 811.
29. Id.
30. See id at 811; Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 17, at 370.
31.
See Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 811; Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note
17, at 370. Of course, there are branches of Judaism that would not limit an
agunah in this way.

32. See J. David Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and
Possible Means of Civil Enforcement, 16 CONN. L. REv. 201, 231 & n.95
(1984); Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 811; Hardin, supra note 18, at 99.
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ly significant. For example, depending on the circumstances of the
dissolution, the mahr could be triggered.3 3 A mahr can be very
important to a Muslim wife, especially if she looked to the mahr as
a safety net in the event of dissolution.
To address these important religious consequences, parties
sometimes include them in their marriage contract. In Judaism,
there are certain divorce circumstances that require a Jewish husband to give his wife a get, just as there are certain circumstances
in Islam that require a husband's payment of a mahr.34 A provision in a couple's marriage contract stating that Jewish or Islamic
law governs could be alleged to be a contractual promise invoking
those religious norms. Those norms could direct, for example, the
husband to do as his respective religion requires-to give his wife
a get or to pay a mahr. In a contentious divorce, such a contractual
term could easily find its way into a secular court. 35 Indeed, divorces involving religious agreements are not rare. 36 Although
estimates vary from source to source, some commentators have
suggested that there are thousands of agunah women in New York
State alone. 37 The problem grew to such significance that New
33.
See Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 192 n.15 ("There are four main legal
schools or sects within Islam: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. It
should be stressed that there are many variations within the four schools as to
interpretations and implementation of the Qur'an, and thus, it is difficult to generalize across many regions, tribes, and countries."); see also Siddiqui, supra
note 15, at 645.
34. See Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1981) (addressing a wife's claim that her husband was required to give her
a get under their ketubah); Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 192; Siddiqui, supra
note 15, at 645.
35.
See Minkin, 434 A.2d at 667-68; Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (requiring payment of a mahr).
36.
See Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 189-90, 192-202; Alan C. Lazerow,
Comment, Give and "Get"? Applying the Restatement of Contracts to Determine the Enforceability of "Get Settlement" Contracts,39 U. BALT. L. REV. 103
(2009); Wexler, supra note 9, at 740-49; see also infra Part IV (discussing religious contract cases).
37.
Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 812 (citing IRVING BREITOWITZ,
BETWEEN

CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS

LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE AGUNAH

IN

AMERICAN SOCIETY 2 & n.4 (1993)) (pointing to one study that found "15,000

Orthodox and Conservative Jewish women are agunot in New York State"); see
also Breitowitz, supra note 15, at 316 n.6 (noting estimates varying between 50
and 150,000 in New York State).
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York adopted statutes specifically designed to assist women
trapped in agunah status. 38
Hence, while religious marriage agreements both address
and stem from religious matters, they are at their core simply
agreements entered into by two people in which they make promises. The question that the Establishment Clause poses to such
agreements is: if a ketubah or nikah is valid under contract principles, is it nevertheless unenforceable because of its religious content and purpose? Other religious documents, such as commercial
contracts between religious parties, present the same sort of question: even though the document reflects exchanged expectations,
does the fact that it also has religious implications or contains religious terms render it impossible to interpret and enforce without
exceeding the Establishment Clause's limitations? It is these questions that Part III addresses.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE

Although the Supreme Court has never comprehensively
addressed the framework for analysis of religious contracts under
the Establishment Clause, it has decided several cases that suggest
the analysis a court should use. While some cases are complex,
portions of the Court's jurisprudence are firmly settled. In fact,
some of the clearest dictates of the Court emanate from a relatively
straightforward line of cases espousing a "prohibition on coercion."
A. Coercion
The rule against coercion is especially significant, for it directly affects analysis of a religious document under the Establishment Clause. In two fairly recent cases, the Supreme Court
identified a prohibition against coercion grounded in the EstabSee N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236(B)(5)(h), 236(B(6)(d) (McKinney
38.
2010) (instructing a court to, when appropriate, consider any "barrier to remarriage," including religious barriers, in equitable distribution proceedings); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 253(2) (McKinney 2010) (requiring parties to allege when
seeking dissolution of a marriage that he or she has or will take "all steps solely
within his or her power to remove any barrier to the defendant's remarriage").
For additional discussion of these statutes, see sources cited supra note 9.
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lishment Clause. In Lee v. Weisman, a rabbi was invited by a
school principal to give a nonsectarian invocation and benediction
at a middle school graduation. 39 The Court held that, especially for
the school children in attendance, the invocation and benediction
amounted to coerced participation in a religious exercise and therefore a violation of the Establishment Clause. 40 The Court explained:
It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to
do so." The State's involvement in the school prayers challenged today violates these central principles. 4 '
The Court reiterated the Establishment Clause prohibition
against coercion in a subsequent case, Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe.42 Santa Fe involved students saying a
prayer over a public address system before high school football
games.4 3 Looking to its analysis in Lee, the Court held that "the
delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing
those present to participate in an act of religious worship" 44 and
stated that "the government may no more use social pressure to
enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means." 45
Together, Santa Fe and Lee stand for the proposition that
coercing participation in a religious exercise is a violation of the
Establishment Clause. There is no indication that this prohibition
39.
40.

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581-82 (1992).
Id at 598 ("[T]he conformity required of the student in this case was

too high an exaction to withstand . . . the Establishment Clause.

The prayer

exercises in this case are especially improper because the State has in every
practical sense compelled attendance and participation in an explicit religious
exercise . ..

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

).

Id. at 587 (citations omitted).
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
Id. at 294.
Id. at 312.
Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 594) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on religious coercion stemming from school prayer cases is inapplicable to other types of cases. Accordingly, this prohibition will
come directly into play when enforcing religious agreements in
which the parties contract for the performance of a religious exercise. 46 As is discussed in Parts IV, V, and VI, secular courts
should consider such promises unenforceable. Unfortunately,
however, the rest of the inquiry under the Establishment Clause is
not nearly as direct as the prohibition described in Santa Fe and
Lee.
B. Jones et al.: Church Property Cases as Religious Document
Cases
While more tenuous than Santa Fe and Lee, most of the
guiding law for analyzing religious contracts stems from a line of
Supreme Court cases involving church property disputes, the best
known of which is Jones v. Wolf. 47 Although focused on addressing the property disputes at issue, this line of cases also involved
an analysis of religious documents. In Jones, for example, a Georgia church split into two factions. 48 One faction argued that the
church should break away from its affiliation with the hierarchical
Presbyterian Church in the United States ("PCUS"), and the other
faction, in the minority, argued that the church should not disaffiliate. 49 Notwithstanding the pleas of the minority, the local church
broke away from the hierarchical PCUS by a vote of 164 to 94.so
In response, an investigatory commission within the hierarchical
church issued a written ruling declaring that the minority faction

46. Or, alternatively, the prohibition will apply in the event that enforcing
arbitration results in requiring performance of a religious act. See, e.g., Waddell
& Keegan, supra note 13, at 593 ("[A] significant distinction between ordinary
ADR and [Christian] conciliation is the authority of the conciliator/arbitrator to
'grant any remedy or relief that they deem scriptural, just and equitable, and
within the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but not limited to,
specific performance of a contract' (quoting Judith M. Keegan, The Peacemakers: Biblical Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation as a Model Alternative to
Litigation, 1987 Mo. J. DiSP. REsOL. 11, 16 (1987) (citing Rule 40B of the Rules
of Procedure for Christian Conciliation))).
47. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
48. Id. at 598.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 598, 607.
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was "the true congregation" of the local church.5 1 Rather than appealing to a higher church court within the PCUS, the majority
faction sought relief in state and federal courts. 52
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Justices
stated strongly that although the case involved a dispute between
religious parties and involved interpretation of religious documents-the deed to the church and other documents specifying
ownership and control-it was nevertheless an appropriate matter
for secular courts to resolve. The Court remarked:
There can be little doubt about the general authority
of civil courts to resolve this question. The State
has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing
a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively. 5
Although the Court noted that "the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving" such
disputes, it nevertheless rejected the argument that states were required to adopt a broad deference to religious tribunals as a matter
of adjudicating church property disputes. 54 Instead, the Court held
that states were entitled to adopt a "neutral principles of law" approach to resolve such disagreements.5 5
Under the neutral principles of law approach, a court uses
normal legal principles to resolve the dispute between the religious
parties. For example, if a case involves a religious property dispute, the court applies traditional property law axioms. In doing
so, the neutral principles approach authorizes courts to examine
Id. at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted).
51.
52. Id.
Id. at 602; see also Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
53.
Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("Civil courts do not
inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property.").
54. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (quoting Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem '1
Church, 393 U.S. at 449) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 603 (citing Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396
55.
U.S. 367, 368 (1970); Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1 Church, 393 U.S. at
449).
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documents containing religious terms and to interpret them "in
purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts" in de56
To resolve the property dispute in
termining their meaning.
Jones, the neutral principles of law analysis required the Court to
focus on "the language of the deeds, the terms of the local church
charters, the state statutes governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property." 57 In sum,
the Court applied traditional legal principles just as it would in any
other case.
In describing the primary advantages of the neutral principles of law analysis, the Supreme Court noted that it is "completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity."58 Additionally, because the analysis "relies exclusively on objective, wellestablished concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers
and judges[,]" courts are free "from entanglement in questions of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice. "59 Moreover, use of neutral
principles "shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in
general-flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties [through the use of] reversionary
clauses and trust provisions."60
The Jones neutral principles approach can be applied directly to interpretation of religious documents other than charters,
deeds, and constitutions. Indeed, it can be used for any religious
document, and accordingly, Jones provides a standard that courts
should adopt to resolve disputes involving religious contracts.61
Despite its flexibility, 6 2 however, limitations to the Jones standard
56. Id. at 604; see also id. ("[T]here may be cases where the deed, the
corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates religious
concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property.").
57. Id. at 602-03 (adopting the approach utilized by the Court in Md. &
Va. Churches).
58. Id. at 603.
59. Id.
60. Id.
As discussed infra in Part IV, neutral principles is a standard some
61.
courts have in fact adopted to interpret religious contracts-as have some commentators, see infra Part V.
62. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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do exist. In interpreting the language of a document, for instance,
the court must "scrutinize the document in purely secular terms"
and not rely on "religious precepts" in that interpretation.63 The
court would then apply "objective, well-established concepts" of
law to resolve the dispute which, in the case of religious agreements, would generally be concepts of contract law.6 In this way,
the standard itself is remarkably straightforward. A court simply
does what it would do normally, almost as if the parties and documents involved were not religious. The court should read the documents in secular terms and adjudicate the case on that basis.
However, because the parties involved are in fact religious,
the Establishment Clause places additional restrictions on adjudication of the dispute beyond Jones. Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich and Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church also provide important principles. 65 Both cases provide baseline limitations on a court's interpretation and enforcement of religious agreements.
In Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, the Court
considered a dispute over ownership of church property arising
when two local churches withdrew from a hierarchical church.
The local churches disagreed with several actions and pronouncements by the hierarchical church, including issues pertaining to
"ordaining of women as ministers and ruling elders, . . . giving

support to the removal of Bible reading and prayers by children in
the public schools, adopting certain Sunday School literature and
teaching neo-orthodoxy alien to the Confession of Faith and Catechisms," and "ma[king] pronouncements in matters involving
63.
Jones, 443 U.S. at 604; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1296
(9th ed. 2009) (defining precept as "[a] standard or rule of conduct; a command
or principle" and "[a] writ or warrant issued by an authorized person demanding
another's action, such as a judge's order to an officer to bring a party before the
court"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1783 (Philip
Babcock Grove ed., 1993) (defining precept as "a command or principle intended especially as a general rule of action" or as "a written order or mandate
issued by legally constituted authority to a person commanding or authorizing
him to do something").
64. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603. The principles could, in theory, be other
categories of law in particular cases.
65.
See generally Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Church,

393 U.S. 440 (1969).
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international issues such as the Vietnam conflict." 66 After the hierarchical church's attempt to resolve the dispute with the local
churches failed, the hierarchical church took control of the local
churches' properties. 67 The local churches then filed lawsuits in
Georgia, asking the courts to enjoin the hierarchical church from

trespassing. 68
In the lawsuit that followed, the jury was charged to determine whether the hierarchical church had taken actions that
"amount[ed] to a fundamental or substantial abandonment of the
original tenets and doctrines of the [hierarchical church]."69 Under
Georgia law, if the hierarchical church had abandoned its original
tenets, then the church property would belong to the local church.7 0
The jury was therefore called upon to determine what amounted to
the church's original tenets and doctrines and what amounted to
substantial abandonment of those principles.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Justices
held that such an analysis was unconstitutional. 7' The Court
stated,
[T]he departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to
determine matters at the very core of a religion-the
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from
playing such a role. 7 2
Accordingly, Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church reveals
that a court's adjudication of a religious dispute will be unconstitu-

66.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1 Church, 393 U.S. at 442 n. 1 (quoting Presbyterian Church v. E. Heights Presbyterian Church, 159 S.E.2d 690, 692
(Ga. 1968)) (internal quotations omitted).
67. Id. at 443.
68. Id
69. Id at 443-44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70.
Id. at 450.
71.
Id.
72. Id
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tional if it "turn[s] on the resolution by civil courts of controversies
over religious doctrine and practice." 73
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, the Court faced a
different set of facts but announced a similar legal principle. The
case concerned a dispute between the hierarchical Serbian Orthodox Church and the Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese of
that church, Bishop Dionisije Milivojevich.7 4 The hierarchical
church had suspended Milivojevich, and the dispute that followed
addressed both the suspension and the question of who controlled
the American-Canadian Diocese. 75 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Illinois held that "[Milivojevich's] removal and defrockment
had to be set aside as 'arbitrary' because the proceedings resulting
in those actions were not conducted according to the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the Church's constitution and penal
code."7 6 The U.S. Supreme Court therefore had to consider
whether a court could engage in an "arbitrariness" analysis for religious tribunal decisions.
The Court reversed, stating two principles of importance to
interpretation of religious documents. First, the Court held that
detailed inquiry into ecclesiastical law and polity by a civil court
was itself impermissible. It stated:
For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical
actions of a church judicatory are in that sense "arbitrary" must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly
requires the church judicatory to follow, or else in
to the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this

73.
Id. at 450; see also id. at 449 (stating that "the [First] Amendment
therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without
resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine").
74.
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 697-98
(1976).
75. Id at 698 ("The basic dispute is over control of the Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada (AmericanCanadian Diocese), its property and assets.").
76. Id at 708.
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is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits .... 77
Additionally, the Court held that where such detailed review is
necessary, courts must accept the decisions of hierarchical religious tribunals. The Court explained:
[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made
without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but
must accept such decisions as binding on them, in
their application to the religious issues of doctrine
or polity before them. 78
Therefore, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese explains that the
First Amendment both forecloses "extensive" or "searching" inquiry into "religious law and polity" by civil courts, and also requires that civil courts accordingly "defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization." 79
Such principles, in addition to those expressed in Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, are instructive in interpreting religious documents. While not part of the "neutral principles
of law approach" themselves, they are instead principles that operate concurrently with the neutral principles concept to guide a
court's resolution of a case. In Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, the Court sent a clear message that documents that require a court to resolve doctrinal disputes are unenforceable in
Id. at 713; see also id. at 718 (stating "detailed review [is] impermiss77.
ible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
78. Id. at 709; see also id. at 723 ("The constitutional provisions of the
American-Canadian Diocese were not so express that the civil courts could enforce them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry
into church polity.").
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (citing the dictates of Ser79.
bian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 724-25).
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secular courts. Further, even if a question does not require resolution of a doctrinal dispute, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
explained that the Establishment Clause renders extensive inquiries
into religious law and polity unconstitutional. 8 ' The Supreme
Court reaffirmed both principles in Jones.82
Thus, despite the flexibility that the Jones neutral principles
of law approach offers, Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Church and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese significantly restrict a court's ability to interpret and enforce a religious document. This trio of cases outlined a multi-headed legal standard for
judicial analysis of religious documents: (1) courts must not resolve doctrinal disputes in adjudicating a case; (2) courts may not
inquire extensively into religious doctrine or polity; (3) courts must
defer, in certain circumstances, to religious tribunals; and (4) subject to the three prior rules, courts may apply traditional neutral
principles of law to resolve disputes involving interpretation of
religious documents.
Unfortunately, the Jones et al. trio established only a skeletal analysis; it does not, nor does any other Supreme Court case,
expressly flesh out the applicable standard. For example, although
these cases limit how far into religious law and polity a court is
permitted to inquire, they do not clearly define that boundary.
Moreover, while a court must undertake some inquiry into religious law and polity to determine, for example, which hierarchical
court it should defer to,8 3 there is no clear indication of how much
80.
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (noting that "[s]tates, religious organizations,
and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not
to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions"); see also Md. and
Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church., 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[G]eneral principles of property law may not be relied upon if
their application requires civil courts to resolve doctrinal issues.").
81.
SerbianE. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713.
82.
Jones, 443 U.S. at 608-09.
83.

See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 264 &

n.61 (2008) (noting, in discussing appearance before a beth din, that civil courts
must "determin[e] which religious tribunals have authority (within religious
legal systems) to make decisions, something they must do to give effect to decisions of authoritative religious tribunals"); cf Gen. Council on Fin, and Admin.
v. Cal. Super. Ct., 439 U.S. 1355, 1372-73 (1978). In denying a stay, Justice
Rehnquist, as circuit Justice, stated that
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inquiry is too much. For guidance on that question, courts must
look to yet another Establishment Clause doctrine: the Lemon test.
C. The UncertainApplicability of Lemon v. Kurtzman
Jones and its coterie are of prime importance to religious
document cases, but they are not the mainstays of modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Instead, the hallmark analysis is
the Lemon test, so-named after Lemon v. Kurtzman.84 Lemon set
forth the baseline standard that the Supreme Court has often turned
to in Establishment Clause cases, and yet, it is a standard shrouded
with uncertainty. To address that uncertainty, this section considers: (1) the actual contours of the Lemon test in light of recent evolution in the test's case law; (2) the current validity of Lemon as a
general Establishment Clause standard; and (3) the applicability of
Lemon to religious document cases. On that framework, this section concludes that Lemon is both currently valid as an assessment
tool and is a helpful addition to the religious document tool belt.
The current status of Lemon's contours is in flux. To be
constitutional under the test's original formulation, government
action: (1) "must have a secular . .. purpose[,]" (2) "its principal or

primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and (3) it "must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."85 The Court originally considered these
prongs separately, but in recent cases such as Agostini v. Felton, it
has apparently folded the third prong-entanglement-into the

In my view, applicant plainly is wrong when it asserts that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent a civil court from
independently examining, and making the ultimate decision
regarding, the structure and actual operation of a hierarchical
church and its constituent units in an action such as this.
There are constitutional limitations on the extent to which a
civil court may inquire into and determine matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity in adjudicating intrachurch disputes. But this Court never has suggested that those constraints similarly apply outside the context of such intraorganization disputes.
Id. at 372 (citation omitted).
84.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
85.
Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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second-effect. 86
Thus, the ever-controversial entanglement
prong87 appears to now only be a consideration that assists in revealing government actions that impermissibly advance religion
under Lemon's effects prong.
Some courts, however, have continued to apply the entanglement inquiry post-Agostini as if entanglement was still a distinct
inquiry.89 While it is possible that Agostini only modified Lemon
86.
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997) ("[T]he factors
we use to assess whether an entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to the factors we use to examine 'effect.' . . . Thus, it is simplest to recognize why entan-

glement is significant and treat it-as we did in Walz-as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect."); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 668-69 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In Agostini v. Felton, we
folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry. This made sense
because both inquiries rely on the same evidence, and the degree of entanglement has implications for whether a statute advances or inhibits religion, see
Lynch v. Donnelly." (portions of citations omitted)).
87.
See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616 (1988) ("[T]he 'entanglement' prong of the Lemon test has been much criticized over the years.");
Stephen M. Feldman, Divided We Fall: Religion, Politics, and the Lemon Entanglements Prong, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 253, 264 (2009) ("No part of
the Lemon test has proven more controversial than the entanglements prong.");
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 1373, 1392 (1981) ('Entanglement' is such a 'blurred, indistinct, and
variable' term that it is useless as an analytic tool." (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at
614)).
88.
See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 87, at 273 ("Lemon, it seemed, had
become a two-pronged test, examining purpose and effects."); see also Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("Whereas in Lemon
we had considered whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, in Agostini we modified Lemon for
purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second
factors." (citations omitted)).
89.
See Am. Atheists Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir.
2010) (citing the third prong), modified on reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 637
F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010); Summers v. Adams, 669 F. Supp. 2d 637, 657-58,
664-65 (D.S.C. 2009) (finding a violation under all three prongs). Other courts
are incorporating the third prong into the second as indicated in Agostini. See,
e.g., Does v. Enfield Public Schs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 172, 186 (D. Conn. 2010)
("incorporat[ing] the analysis of whether ... an 'excessive entanglement' with
religion [exists in] the second prong of the Lemon test"); cf Incantalupo v. Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 652 F. Supp. 2d 314, 322-23 n.7 (E.D.N.Y.
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as to factual scenarios akin to Agostini's-e.g., "for purposes of
evaluating aid to schools" only and not for all instances in which
Lemon is applied 9o-there are no clear indications of that from the
Court. Further, wherever Lemon's third prong is considered in the
analysis, the Court's demotion of "excessive entanglement" to a
subsidiary element of the effects prong in at least some contexts
demonstrates a de-emphasis on entanglement concerns under the
Clause. Therefore, while the exact contents of the Lemon test are
something of a mystery in modern jurisprudence, it is clear that the
test still involves an inquiry into whether the government acted
with a secular purpose,91 and it is still clear that the test prohibits
government actions that have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. At the same time, it is evident that the presence
of church-state entanglement is less dispositive in recent years than
it was at the test's birth.
Even with such a framework in mind, however, one must
question whether the Lemon test is still a valid Establishment
Clause test. Despite its continued existence, the status of the Lemon test in general Establishment Clause jurisprudence is classically
uncertain. From the test's formal birth in 1971,92 the Court has
applied it in several cases and a variety of contexts, and neverthe2009) ("Recent Supreme Court cases have focused on just the first two prongs . .
. . But, once again, the Second Circuit has apparently not followed the Supreme
Court's guidance, and continued to apply the full three part Lemon test. Consequently, so does this Court." (citations omitted)).
90.
See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-08 (plurality opinion) ("Whereas in
Lemon we had considered whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive
entanglement between government and religion, in Agostini we modified Lemon
for purposes of evaluatingaidto schools and examined only the first and second
factors." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Mark Strasser, Repudiating Everson: On Buses, Books, and Teaching Articles ofFaith, 78 Miss. L.J.
567, 628 (2009) ("The Court noted that the factors we use to assess whether an
entanglement is excessive are similar to the factors we use to examine effect,
and thereby made the three-part Lemon Test into a two-part test, at least for
purposes of determining whether aid to sectarian schools violated the Establishment Clause." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
See, e.g., McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S.
91.
844, 859-60 (2005) (citing and applying Lemon's purpose prong).
92. Id.
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less, several Justices have expressed doubt over its validity.9 3 In
fact, a plurality of the Court recently noted Lemon's questionable
role in future Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 94 On the other
hand, decisions in the last decade have expressly applied or cited
approvingly to the Lemon analysis,9 5 and the Court has rejected
prior requests to jettison Lemon.96 Thus, given Lemon's long history at the Court, the fact that it has shown remarkable staying
power in the face of vivid and repeated criticism, and the fact that
the Court relied on it in one of its most recent opinions, 97 it seems
that-at least for now-Lemon is still a valid tool for assessing an
alleged Establishment Clause violation.

93.
Justice Scalia has been one of Lemon's most vocal critics. See, e.g.,
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly
sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
attorneys . . . . Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to
be sure, not fully six feet under: Our decision in Lee v. Weisman conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also
declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in
their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion [Justice White] repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so.
Id. at 398 (citation omitted) (citing cases wherein Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist, and White criticized Lemon).
94.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) ("[fJ]ust two years
after Lemon was decided, we noted that the factors identified in Lemon serve as
'no more than helpful signposts.' Many of our recent cases simply have not
applied the Lemon test.

. .

. Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the

larger scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in
dealing with [the case before us].") (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
95.
See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 859-60 (citing and applying Lemon's purpose prong); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314-16
(2000) (citing and applying Lemon's purpose prong).
96.
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) ("We do not
accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus the United States to reconsider
our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.").
97.
See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 859-60 (decided in 2005).
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Yet, despite its general validity, Lemon's applicability to
religious document cases is still questionable. The church property
cases decided after Lemon did not explicitly apply or cite the Lemon analysis, 98 and this could suggest that Lemon does not govern
religious document cases. On the other hand, some courts have
applied Lemon as the governing standard, 99 and commentators
have occasionally assessed religious contract cases under Lemon's
rubric.o00 There is thus some support among case law and secondary sources for looking to Lemon to reveal Establishment Clause
violations in religious document cases.
There is also some support in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In both Jones and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, the
Court used language that resembled Lemon's prongs. In Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese, the Court noted that in church property
disputes, "there is substantial danger that the State will become
entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on
behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs." 10' This
analysis resembles Lemon's prohibition on governmental actions
that have "a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion" and
actions that create "excessive entanglement" between the govern-

98. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). Similarly, neither case cited Lemon's sister case that sets forth the same three-pronged test, Committeefor Public
Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
99. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (applying the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and Jones); Minkin v.
Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (applying the
three-part test discussed in Lemon but citing to Lemon's sister case, Committee
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973));
Basinger v. Pilarczyk, 707 N.E.2d 1149, 1150 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (citing
Lemon, the court ruled that "[t]he trial court's examination of the conditions of
employment at a church-operated school involves a significant risk of government-religion entanglement and gives rise to a clear violation of the First
Amendment"); cf Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990) (plurality opinion) (applying Lemon in the context of an agreement to
raise the children in the Jewish faith).
100. See generally David M. Cotter, Constitutional Questions Concerning
the Enforcement of Islamic Antenuptial Agreements, 15 DWORCE LITIG. 45
(2003); Greenberg-Kobrin, supranote 17 at 380-82.
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added).
101.
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ment and religion.102 Similarly, in Jones, the Court described the
neutral principles of law approach as "free[ing] civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." 0 3 The Court also went on to discuss whether
neutral principles would result in more or less entanglement than
alternative models.104 Thus, both Jones and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese drew on similar concepts as the Lemon test. o0
While this suggests Lemon has relevance to church property cases,
it is also suggestive of Lemon's relevance to religious contract
cases.
Hence, although it is debatable, this Article concludes that
Lemon can in fact assist in demarcating the Establishment Clause
boundaries in religious document cases. To some extent, Lemon
simply duplicates the Establishment Clause standards elsewhere
established. For example, a proper application of the cases discussed in this part should itself avoid the violations to which Lemon tests are typically applied. After all, by declining to resolve
doctrinal disputes, courts avoid advancing or inhibiting religion
and avoid acting with an improper religious motive-Lemon's first
and second prongs. Moreover, by relying on neutral principles of
law and refusing to engage in extensive inquiry into religious doctrine, courts avoid excessive entanglement.' 06 Conceived in this
regard, Lemon serves as both the silent force behind the neutral

102.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-614 (1971); see also 1

KENT

GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 262 (2006) ("Although the

courts' approach to property disputes differs from standard free exercise and
establishment tests, it reflects modem attention to equality in constitutional law
and the dominant theme of religion-clause adjudication, that too much intertwining of government and religion is unhealthy." (footnote omitted)).
103.
Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
104.
Id. at 604-06.
105.
Cf Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise:
The SurprisingLessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1633, 1644 (2004) (noting
that "[j]ust as in Wolf the Court in Hull appeared to give priority to entanglement concerns [in its analysis]" and linking that concern to Free Exercise Clause
matters).
106. As already noted, however, Lemon's third prong is of questionable
independent potency since it has been folded into Lemon's second prong. See
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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principles analysis and as an additional marker of the boundaries of
the neutral principles model. 0 7
Lemon also offers assistance in identifying violations because it introduces into the conversation additional guidance from
cases addressing the Establishment Clause. There are scant few
church property cases to illuminate the gray areas of Jones, Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese that courts might face in attempting to interpret
and enforce a given religious document. Lemon, however, is a
more common subject of judicial discussion. By looking to Lemon
and the Supreme Court's cases discussing it, courts can infer additional guidance as to the appropriate method for adjudicating religious document cases.
The most unsettled question arising from Jones and its related cases is how far courts can look into religious doctrine, polity, and practices when interpreting a religious document. If an
Islamic marriage contract states that the husband is only obligated
to pay the wife the mahr "when required by Shari'a," may the
court inquire into what Islam's divine law in fact states? 08 It is
clear that courts cannot resolve doctrinal disputes that they encounIt is also hard to imagine a case that involved a clear violation of the
107.
Lemon test and yet was otherwise constitutional. But see Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Interestingly, given the recent referendum in Oklahoma amending its
108.
state constitution to forbid courts from considering or using international law or
Shari'aLaw, it might be impossible for a state court in Oklahoma to inquire into
Shari'a consistent with Oklahoma's amended constitution. See H.R.J. Res.
1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), https://www.sos.ok.gov/ documents/questions/ 755.pdf; see also Michael Crowley, Ballot Measure Update:
Oklahoma Safe from Sharia Law, TIME.COM SWAMPLAND: POL. INSIGHT FROM
BELTWAY
AND
BEYOND
(Nov.
2,
2010),

THE

http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2010/11/02/ballot-measure-update-oklahomasafe-from-sharia-law/.
As of November 9, 2010, the constitutional amendment was under a
temporary restraining order issued by federal judge Vick Miles LaGrange precluding its application. The proponent of the lawsuit noted that "the measure
could preclude the courts from enforcing or executing [my] will, since it includes references to Islamic law." Josh Gerstein, Judge Blocks Oklahoma Ban
on

Sharia

Law,

POuTICO.COM

(Nov.

http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/l1
on Sharia law.html.

8,

2010,

2:05

PM),

0/JudgeblocksOklahoma ban
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ter in such an inquiry,109 yet there is otherwise no clear answer to
the question of how much courts may inquire. Lemon and its
progeny, however, arguably help reveal the answer.
The primary Establishment Clause violation that courts risk
when inquiring into religious law and polity is an entanglementbased problem. If the court simply looks at and interprets religious
law, it does not, in doing so, advance religion under Lemon 's
second prong. Nor is, presumably, the court inquiring into anything other than a secular purpose, thereby avoiding a violation of
Lemon's first prong. The court is, however, intertwining state tendrils with religious affairs. This alone presents a potential entanglement problem. Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence applying Lemon-Agostini and Mitchell-has, at a minimum, significantly undercut the potency of the entanglement
prong,110 and it is possible that the entanglement inquiry has been
completely absorbed into the effects prong."' If that is indeed the
case and no significant effect on religion arises from a court performing its traditional fact-finding function for religious matters,
then under the current form of the Lemon test as modeled in Agostini and Mitchell, there is no Establishment Clause violation when
a court inquires into religious law and polity.
Although permitting such fact-finding invites much debate,
there is merit in allowing courts to inquire into religious doctrine,
109.
See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying discussion (citing Serbian
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) and Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969)).
110.
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668-69 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In Agostini v. Felton, we folded the entanglement
inquiry into the primary effect inquiry. This made sense because both inquiries
rely on the same evidence, and the degree of entanglement has implications for
whether a statute advances or inhibits religion." (citations omitted)); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997) ("[T]he factors we use to assess whether an
entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to the factors we use to examine 'effect.'
... Thus, it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and treat
it-as we did in Walz-as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect.").
111.
See Feldman, supra note 87, at 273 ("Lemon, it seemed, had become
a two-pronged test, examining purpose and effects."); see also Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("[I]n Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the
first and second factors.").
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polity, and practices. In fact, the Supreme Court itself has implicitly recognized this by engaging in such inquiries. 112 In several opinions, the Court has interpreted and described the beliefs and practices of several religions, including Christianity, Judaism, and
Scientology.113 These inquiries should not be surprising. First
Amendment cases involving disputes between religious parties
often require examining the context of the religious dispute, if for
no other reason than to understand the nature and origin of the alleged wrong. If a court is charged to resolve the dispute,1 14 how
112. The Court has inquired into religious practices, beliefs, and doctrine
via basic fact-finding both in individual justices' opinions and also in majority
opinions. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 6 (1929)
(observing that "[e]ver since the Council of Trent (1545-1563), it has been the
law of the church that no one can be appointed to a collative chaplaincy before
his fourteenth year"); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005)
(discussing the origin of the Ten Commandments); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 903-04 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that "[p]eyote
is a sacrament of the Native American Church"); id at 914-15, 919-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (concluding that "[n]ot only does the church's doctrine forbid nonreligious use of peyote; it also generally advocates self-reliance, familial
responsibility, and abstinence from alcohol.") (citing Brief for Ass'n of Am.
Indian Affairs et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Emp 't Div., Dep 't
ofHuman Res. of Or., 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126853; Olsen v.
Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1989); People v.
Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 818 n.3 (Cal. 1964) (en banc)); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579-87 (1989) (interpreting the religious significance of,
for example, a creche, Christmas, and Chanukah and citing and quoting repeatedly the Bible, the Talmud, multiple religious encyclopedias, and several books
and articles on Christian and Jewish holidays and religious observations for
each); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1989) (describing the beliefs and practices of Scientology); Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 13-15 (quoting and
interpreting canons of the Codex Juris Canonici).
113. See cases cited supra note 112.
114. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871) ("Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for
benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are
equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject
to its restraints."); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 844 (N.J. 2002) ("The
First Amendment does not immunize every legal claim against a religious institution and its members."); Hardwick v. First Baptist Church, 524 A.2d 1298,
1301 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("Although the church is a religious institution and entitled to protection from civil interference, it is also a religious corporation whose members are entitled to rights afforded by statute."); S. Ohio
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can it avoid the investigation required to resolve the case without
also avoiding the charge? 15 In some cases it cannot. Thus, the
Supreme Court recognizes that some inquiry will be required in a
number of religious cases.
Once it is a given that some inquiry is required to address
many religious disputes, it is equally clear that drawing lines between permissible inquiry and prohibited inquiry is difficult.
Should a court distinguish between historical inquiry-a question
about, for example, how a religious holiday came to pass-and an
interpretation of the holiday's meaning in light of that origin?
Which sources would be permissible, and which would be prohibited? Could a court consult an encyclopedia describing religion
but not a religious encyclopedia?ll 6 Could it review an affidavit in
the record from an individual quoting his religious beliefs but then
not look into the religious work in question, even if the court merely sought to see if the work actually contains the words the party
quoted? Where would the line be between reading a scholarly article about religious beliefs and reading the doctrine that the article
was considering? While these questions do not dictate that a court
must be permitted to inquire into religious law, they nevertheless
illustrate that if inquiry is permissible, it will be difficult to
contain.
On the other hand, if inquiry is impermissible, the results
could be deeply troubling. Because the Establishment Clause applies to more than just the judiciary, a prohibition on inquiry into
State Exec. Officers of Church of God v. Fairborn Church of God, 573 N.E.2d
172, 180 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) ("[C]ourts cannot avoid their responsibility to
resolve a dispute civil in character because the litigants are religious bodies.");
cf Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 729 (N.J. 1991)
("[C]ourts have the power, and perhaps a duty as well, to enforce secular contract rights, despite the fact that the contracting parties may base their rights on
religious affiliations.").
115.
This is not to suggest, however, that the general duty of a court to
resolve disputes somehow negates the overriding requirement that courts act
constitutionally, i.e., within the boundaries of the First Amendment. The intended point is observational: if a court is called upon to resolve a religious
dispute it will at times be required to engage in some basic fact-finding inquiry
into religious matters.
116.
Cf County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579-87 (interpreting the religious significance of a cr&che, Christmas, and Chanukah and repeatedly citing
and quoting multiple religious encyclopedias).
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religious law would impact more than the ability of courts to adjudicate significant and important disagreements between religious
parties. It would also limit the legislative and executive branches
in faith-based matters, thereby crippling their efforts at governance. After all,
[v]alues that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights
are not thereby banished from the political process.
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment
is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the
dissemination of the printed word, so also a society
that believes in the negative protection accorded to
religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of
that value in its legislation as well.' 17
Congress and the state legislatures have routinely attempted to accommodate religious practices through legislative action,11 8 but
how could those laws ever be intelligently crafted if legislative
bodies were precluded from making fact-based inquiries into the
religious beliefs, practices, and needs of the accommodated constituents? 1 9 Similarly, how would each branch accommodate reli117.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
See id at 920-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), (noting that Congress
118.
recognized that peyote and other substances "have religious significance because they are sacred, they have power, they heal, they are necessary to the exercise of the rites of the religion, they are necessary to the cultural integrity of
the tribe, and, therefore, religious survival" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, at
2 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262, 1263)).
See Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a "Religious Question" Doctrine?
119.
JudicialAuthority to Examine Religious Practicesand Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L.
REv. 497, 543 (2005) ("Congress and the executive branch more generally are
also authorized to make positive assessments about the content of religious beliefs and practices. The political branches are understood to have authority to
establish exemptions from generally applicable laws for religious conduct, and
they may do so based on examination and assessment of religious practices and
beliefs. . . . If the political branches could not make such positive declarations
regarding the content of religious practices and beliefs, the government could
never act to accommodate religion." (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335
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gion among the branch's internal operations without assessing religious matters? For example, consider the need to hire and provide
chaplains to military members serving abroad. Absent some religious inquiry, there can be no informed decision regarding a chaplain's eligibility for the position or his or her appropriateness for
the faith-based community to be served. 12 0
There are at least two responses to these difficulties: allow
some inquiry into religion or foreclose inquiry completely. There
are commentators and courts on both sides of the issue, arguing
separately that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence can
be read to require either option.121 However, as this Article has
argued, there is room in the Court's existing jurisprudence authorizing and guiding basic inquiry into religious law and polity.1 22
That inquiry does, however, have limits. While some recent cases
applying Lemon could arguably be read to supersede even the earlier prohibition on "extensive inquiry" into religious law-on the
theory that the original prohibition was grounded in entanglement
concerns and recent cases have relaxed the prohibition on statereligion interaction-this Article does not go quite so far. Al(1987)); see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 ("[I]t is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions."); McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[G]overnment
[may] take religion into account .. . to exempt, when possible, from generally
applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed .... .").
See Goldstein, supra note 119, at 525-33 (raising this question and
120.
others).
Cf Brady, supra note 105, at 1689 ("Courts are not fit to interpret
121.
religious doctrine and engage in religious questions."); Goldstein, supra note
119, at 512-13 (concluding that "[c]ases following Presbyterian Church, however, eliminate any residual authority for courts to construe religious terms,
however clearly expressed" but arguing that it would be preferable if courts
could inquire into religious issues).
122.
See discussion supra this Part; see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 233 (1997) ("Interaction between church and state is inevitable and we
have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause."
(citation omitted)); id. at 233-34 ("Under our current understanding of the Establishment Clause, [that a program required administrative cooperation between the government and a religious entity is] insufficient by [itself] to create
an 'excessive' entanglement.").

32

The University ofMemphis Law Review

Vol. 42

though the Court might in its next religious document case allow
even extensive factual inquiry into religious matters, it has not
committed itself to such a destination.123 Until it does, courts
should adhere to the Supreme Court's existing case law under
Jones et al. and Lemon.124 Nevertheless, courts should not only
recognize that traditional fact-finding inquiries into religion are
permissible, but insofar as courts do not resolve any doctrinal disputes or engage in broad-sweeping reviews, they should recognize
that basic inquiry is desirable.

Rather, to the contrary, the Court has done nothing but obscure the
123.
path. In its most recent cases specifically discussing the Lemon test in full, the
Court seemed to suggest that it was now a two-prong test that contemplated
entanglement as problematic only in light of the second prong. See Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668-69 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In
Agostini v. Felton, we folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect
inquiry." (citation omitted)); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000)
("Whereas in Lemon we had considered [all three prongs], in Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the
first and second factors." (citation omitted)); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233 ("[I]t is
simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and treat it-as the Court
did in Walz-as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect."). Yet those
same cases leave open the possibility that the Court only modified Lemon's third
prong as to school aid cases. Other recent cases citing Lemon have mentioned it
was a three-prong test without applying the third prong or clarifying its current
validity. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005)
(noting that "Lemon v. Kurtzman summarized the three familiar considerations
for evaluating Establishment Clause claims" but then focusing only on the secular purpose prong of the test) (emphasis added); id. at 883 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the state "may not entangle itself with religion" but citing
Walz for that rule-just as she did in discussing the modification in Agostini);
see also Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010) (noting the district
court's application of the third prong of the Lemon test but not clarifying or
applying the prong); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685-86 (2005) (declining to apply, much less elaborate on, the Lemon test's current status).
See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237 ("We do not acknowledge, and we
124.
do not hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by
implication, overruled an earlier precedent. We reaffirm that '[i]f a precedent of
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected
in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions."' (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
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D. Summary ofEstablishment ClauseLimitations
As the foregoing illustrates, the Establishment Clause plays
a significant role in analyzing religious documents, limiting both
the adjudication process and its outcome. Through extension of
the neutral principles of law approach described in Jones, civil
courts have a mechanism for avoiding Establishment Clause violations when interpreting and enforcing religious documents. Even
when applying neutral principles, however, courts are still constrained. First, courts may not conduct an excessively "detailed
inquiry"l 2 5 into religious law or polity, and they also cannot compel participation in a religious exercise.126 MoTeover, despite
Lemon 's marked history, courts must contend with its standard. To
borrow Justice Scalia's words from another context, the Lemon test
lurks in the background of all religious document cases "[like
some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried."1 27 Although it is not definitively certain whether Lemon governs the analysis of religious document cases, this Article argues
that Lemon is helpful in identifying Establishment Clause violations.
IV. RELIGIOUS DOCUMENTS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Even if the judicial bounds of the Establishment Clause can
be measured, the Clause's specific applicability to religious documents demands further examination. Although the Supreme Court
has only rarely addressed religious documents, lower state and federal courts have confronted them in far greater numbers. Two
types of cases have come before the courts frequently: cases involving religious property disputes and cases involving marriage
contracts from Jewish and Islamic couples. However, religious
documents have also been reviewed in other contexts, including
125.
See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
718 (1976) (stating that a 'detailed review' [was] impermissible under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments").
126.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000); Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
127.
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note 93.
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employment contracts,1 28 arbitration clauses,129 child custody
agreements,1 30 and various other documents touching on religious
matters or invoking religious language. 131 Because drawing from
these cases is helpful in identifying the types of issues courts face
when asked to interpret religious documents, this Part surveys federal and state decisions from around the country.
Perhaps the best known religious document case is Avitzur
v. Avitzur, a dispute involving a religious marriage agreement.132
In Avitzur, the defendant-husband obtained a divorce from his
plaintiff-wife, and the wife thereafter filed a lawsuit seeking to
compel him to appear before a beth din.' 33 The wife based her
claim for relief on their marriage contract, the ketubah.134 The trial
court concluded that the lawsuit was simply seeking to "command
upon the [husband] to do what is alleged he agreed to do in advance." 135 On appeal, however, the intermediate appellate court
disagreed. It concluded:
The agreement which plaintiff is attempting to specifically enforce was entered into as part of a religious ceremony and, by its own terms, was "exSee cases cited supra note 7.
128.
See cases cited supranote 8.
129.
See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
130.
(plurality opinion) (addressing an oral agreement to raise the children in the
Jewish faith, in the context of an order forbidding the father taking the children
to non-Jewish religious services).
See, e.g., Nat'l Grp. for Commc'ns & Computers Ltd. v. Lucent
131.
Techs. Int'l Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. 2004) (addressing a choice of law
provision that set Saudi Arabia's divine law as applicable); cf Miller v. Miller,
620 A.2d 1161, 1168 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting a
case not raising Establishment Clause issues, a Christian Conciliation agreement
addressing marital dissolution, child custody, and arbitration, among other matters).
132. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).
Avitzur v. Avitzur, 449 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (interme133.
diate appellate court proceedings), rev'd, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983). A beth
din is "a rabbinical tribunal commonly comprised of three rabbis, or one rabbi
and two lay persons, assembled to decide matters of Jewish law or resolve disputes." See Breitowitz, supra note 15, at 326; supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
134. Avitzur, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
135. Id. (quoting the trial court).
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ecuted and witnessed .. . in accordance with Jewish
law and tradition."
The State, having already
granted the parties a civil divorce, has no further interest in their marital status. It would thus be a dangerous precedent to allow State courts to enforce liturgical agreements concerning matters about which
the State has no remaining concern. . . . The sole

purpose behind compelling this appearance [before
a beth din] is to enable plaintiff to obtain a religious
divorce so that she may at some time in the future
marry in accordance with her religious beliefs.'
As a result, the court held that the husband's motion to dismiss
should have been granted, and the wife appealed.
In the Court of Appeals of New York, the judges split four
to three on the issue. The majority concluded that the ketubah
could be enforced without violating the First Amendment, while
the dissent argued that any enforcement of the ketubah would necessarily entangle the court in "matters of religious and ecclesiastical content."l 37 Both the majority and dissent began by emphasizing the language of the agreement itself. The agreement read in
full:
On the First Day of the Week, the 3rd Day of the
Month Sivan, 5726, corresponding to the 22nd Day
of May, 1966, Boaz Avitzur, the bridegroom, and
Susan Rose Wieder, the bride, were united in marriage in Old Westbury, N.Y. The bridegroom made
the following declaration to his bride: "Be thou my
wife according to the law of Moses and Israel. I
shall honor and support thee, faithfully I shall cherish thee and provide for thy needs, even as Jewish
husbands are required to do by our religious law
and tradition."

136. Id.
137.
See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 136-37 (Wachtler, J., for the Court); id. at
139 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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In turn, the bride took upon herself the duties of a
Jewish wife, to honor and cherish her husband, and
to carry out all her obligations to him in faithfulness
and affection as Jewish law and tradition prescribe.
And in solemn assent to their mutual responsibilities and love, the bridegroom and bride have declared: As evidence of our desire to enable each
other to live in accordance with the Jewish law of
marriage throughout our lifetime, we, the bride and
bridegroom, attach our signatures to this Ketubah,
and hereby agree to recognize the Beth Din of the
Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological
Seminary of America, or its duly appointed representatives, as having authority to counsel us in the
light of Jewish tradition which requires husband and
wife to give each other complete love and devotion,
and to summon either party at the request of the
other, in order to enable the party so requesting to
live in accordance with the standards of the Jewish
law of marriage throughout his or her lifetime. We
authorize the Beth Din to impose such terms of
compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond
to its summons or to carry out its decision.
This Ketubah was executed and witnessed this day
in accordance with Jewish law and tradition.
Boaz Avitzur bridegroom Susan Wieder bride Melvin Kieffer rabbi Abraham Weisman witness Melvin Kieffer witness.138
In reaching its decision, the majority emphasized the third
paragraph in which the parties stated that they "agree[d] to recognize the Beth Din ... as having authority to counsel [them] in the
light of Jewish tradition . . . .,,13

The court concluded that the wife

"[was] not attempting to compel [the] defendant to obtain a Get or
138.
139.

Id. at 140 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Id. at 137.
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to enforce a religious practice arising solely out of principles of
religious law," but rather, the court suggested that the wife merely
sought "to enforce an agreement made by [the] defendant to appear
before and accept the decision of a designated tribunal." 4 0 The
majority then held that the case could be decided using only neutral principles of contract law, citing to Jones, and acknowledged
that despite "the religious character of the Ketubah," the court
could still enforce its "purely secular terms."1 4 1 Endorsing the
possibility of compelling the husband to submit to a beth din, the
court reversed.142 The United States Supreme Court denied the
husband's petition for review.143
The three dissenting judges of the Court of Appeals of New
York began their analysis by noting agreement with the majority
that the proper analytical model was to apply neutral principles of
law in the interpretation and enforcement of the agreement. 1
Nevertheless, because both the husband and the wife had proffered
conflicting interpretations of the document and of Jewish law, the
dissenting judges concluded that "any judicial determination
whether the husband is obligated to appear before the beth din ...
necessarily involve[d] reference to substantive religious and ecclesiastical law." 1 45 Moreover, based on the evidence that the wife
had submitted to support her motion in the trial court, the dissent
predicted that any new proceedings would involve the introduction
of expert witness testimony concerning Jewish law and tradition.146
In light of this entanglement with religion and the dissenters' belief
that the parties never intended the agreement to empower civil
courts to determine their substantive rights, the dissent concluded
that the ketubah could not be enforced to require the husband to
appear before a beth din. The dissent regarded the matter as "well
beyond the authority of any civil court" because the ultimate goal

140.
141.
142.
143.
certiorari
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Avitzur v. Avitzur, 464 U.S. 817 (1983) (denying petition for writ of
without elaboration).
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 139 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Id. at 141 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Id. at 141-42 (Jones, J., dissenting).
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of compelling the husband to appear before the beth din would be
for the wife to obtain a religious divorce.14 7
While undoubtedly informative, Avitzur is far from the only
decision interpreting religious marriage agreements. For example,
in In re Marriage of Goldman, an Illinois appellate court faced
similar facts to those in Avitzur.148 In Goldman, however, a wife
was specifically seeking to compel her husband to provide her with
a get.149 Although their ketubah contained language similar to the
ketubah in Avitzur,150 it did not expressly discuss the husband providing the wife with a get in the event of divorce.' 5 '
Yet, while the ketubah did not specifically mention a get,
Annette-the wife-was able to introduce significant evidence
supporting her claim against Kenneth-the husband.15 2 For instance, Annette claimed that Kenneth had insisted on giving his
prior wife a get and that he specifically asked the clerk for an Orthodox ketubah when both he and Annette selected one for their
own marriage. Furthermore, when Annette asked if a get was real147.
148.
1990).
149.
150.

Id. at 142 (Jones, J., dissenting).
In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct.
Id. at 1018.
The language of the ketubah in Goldman was:
The said Bridegroom made the following declaration to his
Bride:
"Be thou my wife according to the law of Moses and Israel. I
faithfully promise that I will be a true husband unto thee; I
will honor and cherish thee; I will work for thee; I will protect
and support thee, and will provide all that is necessary for thy
sustenance, even as it beseemeth a Jewish husband to do. I also take upon myself all further obligations for thy maintenance, as are prescribed by our religious statute."
And the said Bride has plighted her troth unto him, in affection and in sincerity, and has thus taken upon herself the fulfillment of all the duties incumbent upon a Jewish wife.

This Covenant of Marriage was duly executed and witnessed
this day according to the usage of Israel.
Id. at 1018-19.
Id. at 1018-20.
151.
152. Id. at 1019-20.
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ly necessary, she claimed Kenneth told her that marrying into the
Jewish faith requires "get[ting] divorced according to the Jewish
faith." In general, Annette's testimony indicated that she and her
husband understood "the law of Moses and Israel" to require the
provision of a get under the ketubah, as that law governed their
marriage. Supplementing Annette's own proof was expert testimony by two Orthodox rabbis who explained that Judaism contains secular as well as religious laws and that the ketubah and
marriage contracts were secular contracts. Moreover, while the
rabbis testified that the termination of the marriage under Orthodox
Jewish law required the giving of a get, they suggested the get procedure was "secular rather than religious in nature," notwithstanding its several formalities.153
In response, Kenneth also offered evidence relating to the
ketubah. Notably, he introduced a deposition from the rabbi who
officiated the marriage wherein the rabbi stated that the ketubah
was more symbolic than literal, and Kenneth also testified that he
viewed the ketubah as poetry or art as opposed to a contract.154 In
addition, Kenneth testified "at great length as to his dislike for Orthodox Judaism" because he believed that Orthodox Judaism discriminated against women.15s
The trial court ruled that the parties intended Orthodox
Jewish law to govern the marriage and that the expert testimony
demonstrated that Orthodox Judaism required Kenneth to give Annette a get. The trial court thus dissolved the marriage and ordered
the husband to provide Annette, either himself or by proxy, with a
get.156 On appeal, the appellate court applied Lemon, looking to
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test for additional guidance.157
Affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate court held that
enforcing the ketubah: (1) had a secular purpose in protecting the
right to contract and fostering dissolution, (2) would not have a
primary effect that advanced or inhibited religion in light of testimony that providing a get was a secular act, and (3) would avoid
153.
Id. at 1020.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Id. at 1021.
157.
Id. at 1022-23; see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing the endorsement test).
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excessive entanglement because the court relied on neutral principles of contract law, not "consideration of doctrinal matters."15 8
Finally, the appellate court held that Kenneth's free exercise rights
were not violated and noted that his dislike of Orthodox Judaism
"did not rise to the level of a religious belief." 59 The court then
concluded that he was not being compelled to participate in any

religious act.160
Like Avitzur, however, the dissent in Goldman argued that
enforcing the ketubah "require[d] interpretation of religious doctrines and ... worship," in addition to requiring "[Kenneth's] involvement in an act of religious worship." 1 61 Further reasoning
that "[a]n individual's participation, even by proxy, in a religious
ritual is a form of religious worship," the dissent stated that a "civil
court has no right to dictate one's religion or the form in which one
practices the religion of his choice."' 62 Moreover, in arguing that
the terms of the ketubah were indefinite, the dissent claimed that
"the trial court's order .

.

. c[ould] not be distinguished from the

court making a contract for the parties." 63
Were Goldman and Avitzur correctly decided? Was the
boundary between church and state breached by requiring the husbands to give a get and appear before a beth din, respectively? Did
either court inquire into religious doctrine or polity beyond the
permissible limits?
158. In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023 (citing Avitzur v.
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (1983)).
159. Id. at 1023. Presumably, the court intended this quote to mean that
Kenneth had a strong dislike of Orthodox Judaism, but his feelings did not derive from a religious basis-instead, the court seems to have concluded that his
feelings had a more general or political basis. It is still interesting that the court
used the verb "rise" and the term "level" thereby suggesting that religious beliefs are somehow above all other beliefs. Perhaps, however, the court simply
meant that religious beliefs "rise" above the masses of other beliefs in that religious beliefs are given specialized protection under the religion clauses of the
First Amendment.
160. Id. at 1023-24. The court also considered whether Kenneth's rights
under the Illinois Constitution's religion clause were violated, but held that they
were not, because Kenneth had not shown the clause to provide any additional
or different protection from the First Amendment. Id. at 1024.
Id at 1025-26 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
161.
162. Id at 1026 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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When pursuing these questions, it is clear that reasonable
minds may differ somewhat in their individual analyses. Nevertheless, those who are disturbed by the Goldman and Avitzur rulings
should recognize that such cases are far from the most extreme
examples. In Kaplinsky v. Kaplinsky, for example, a New York
appellate court upheld a contempt order's penalty of imprisonment
imposed on a husband for failing to give his wife a get.'
Other
courts have held the same,165 and still other courts have demonstrated an overt willingness to engage in religious inquiry. For
instance, in Minkin v. Minkin, a New Jersey court "on its own motion requested the testimony of several distinguished rabbis well
versed in Jewish law" to determine, based on their analysis of religious law, if enforcing a disputed ketubah would violate the Establishment Clause.
Analogous expert testimony has been sought
164.
Kaplinsky v. Kaplinsky, 603 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993).
165. See Fischer v. Fischer, 655 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
(stating that a husband could be imprisoned because "he failed to voluntarily
give the [agreed upon] 'get' and he failed to set up a payment schedule for the
continuously mounting arrears"); Megibow v. Megibow, 612 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) ("Plaintiff's failure to cooperate in [giving his wife a get]
may result in punishment for contempt."); cf Sieger v. Sieger, 806 N.Y.S.2d
448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpublished table decision) (discussing the interaction of a Heter and a get in the context of a complex dissolution, and making the
seemingly contradictory conclusions that: (1) "having determined that the court
'cannot restrict the religious and quasi-religious actions of one of the parties,' it
follows that the court cannot punish a party, economically or otherwise, for having obtained a religious divorce" and yet (2) "that defendant is not without relief
in the event that plaintiff refuses to provide her with an affidavit that he will
remove all barriers to her remarriage or refuses to give her a Get prior to the
entry of judgment of divorce. In this regard, it is clear that the court has the
authority to compel a breaching party to comply by use of fines, the withholding
of civil economic relief, a finding of contempt and/or imposing a term of imprisonment . . . ." (citations omitted)), af'd in part and modified in part, 829
N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). But see Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523,
530 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (refusing to compel a husband to give his
wife a get and noting that enforcement would be unpalatable: "The spectre of
[the husband in this case] being imprisoned or surrendering his religious freedoms because of action by a civil court is the very image which gave rise to the
First Amendment.").
166.
Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981)
(emphasis added). The defendant husband also presented a rabbi's testimony.
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in other cases as well.167 Moreover, in the commercial case National Group for Communications & Computers v. Lucent Technologies International,a federal district judge endeavored to apply
the law of Saudi Arabia-a "system [that] is governed exclusively
by what is known as the 'Shari'a,' or divine law . . . derived pri-

marily from the Qur'an"-by, among other things, "carefully consider[ing] the . . . testimony and submissions from . . . Islamic

scholars."' 68 Thus, if Avitzur and Goldman were deemed to have
gone too far in compelling participation in religious acts or inquiring too deeply into religious law, these additional decisions would
seem to be beyond the pale.
Just as there are wide variations in the types of religious
contract cases, there is also diversity in enforcement mechanisms.
While some courts have directly required the party or parties to do
the thing specified in the contract,' 69 other courts have taken a less
direct approach, deliberately eschewing orders of specific performance. For instance, in Rubin v. Rubin, a wife who had agreed to
Id. at 668. Ultimately, the court concluded, based on the testimony of the four
rabbis the court summoned, that "acquisition of a get is not a religious act." Id.
In doing so, the court rejected the testimony to the contrary from defendant's
expert in part because defendant's rabbi testified that the other rabbis were "far
better Jewish scholar[s] than myself" Id.
See, e.g., Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
167.
1996) (involving testimony from family, the parties, and Islamic experts on the
meaning of an Islamic marriage agreement).
Nat'l Grp. for Commc'ns & Computers v. Lucent Techs. Int'l, 331 F.
168.
Supp. 2d 290, 294-95 (emphasis added). Whether or not the judge's careful
scrutiny and application of divine law in this case was constitutional, his diligence was at least commendable. Some commentators have strongly criticized
the Lucent decision. See, e.g., Charles P. Trumbull, Note, Islamic Arbitration:A
New Pathfor InterpretingIslamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REv. 609, 63536 (2006) ("The judge's resolution of this contract dispute violated the First
Amendment. In applying Saudi law (and thus Islamic law) to determine the
parties' rights under the contract, the judge had to conduct an extensive inquiry
[into] Islamic law and make an independent determination of religious doctrine:
the precise scope of the prohibition of gharar. The judge could not rely on secular tools to make this determination because Saudi law is not codified and judicial decisions are not reported. Rather, the judge took on the role of a Muslim
qadi, rejecting the plaintiffs argument because it lacked 'supporting religious
authority."' (footnotes omitted)).
169. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1020-21 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990).
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assist in receiving a get-but had not actually done so-asked the
court to nevertheless order the husband to pay her certain sums
under their agreement.1 70 However, because the parties agreed to
the payment of those sums only if the wife cooperated in receiving
a get, the court held that the failure of the wife to cooperate in the
giving of a get was the failure of a condition precedent.'"' Instead
of ordering the wife to cooperate in receiving a get, an allegedly
religious act, the court instead concluded that until the wife cooperated she would not receive the benefits conditioned upon that cooperation.172 Similarly, in Bloch v. Bloch,17 3 an appellate court
approved a trial court's order that "reserve[d] jurisdiction to reconsider and re-compute the Equitable Distribution, Alimony,
Child Support and other economic provisions of [the court's]
Judgment" if the husband did not "initiate and cooperate in the
obtaining of a [get]."' 4 The trial court's order carefully noted that
the husband "specifically is NOT Ordered" to actually obtain a
get.'7 5 Thus, once again, a court avoided directly ordering an allegedly religious act while simultaneously recognizing that the nonoccurrence of that act would have secular and potentially important
consequences for one or both parties.
Yet, just as some courts have enforced religious agreements, so too have others refused to do so. In Aflalo v. Aflalo, a
New Jersey court declined to follow the decision in Minkinl 76 and
held instead that it could not compel a husband to give his wife a
get. 7 7 The court in Aflalo specifically rejected the notion of sifting
through conflicting testimony from rabbis, as was done in Minkin,
suggesting that doing so would constitute "becoming an arbiter of
170.
Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61, 63-64 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973).
171.
Id. at 67 ("[T]his court is not called upon to enforce this religious
discipline against a recalcitrant party, but, rather, is being called upon by the
Defaultingparty to enforce other relief in her favor at a time when she refuses to
perform a condition precedent thereto, which happens to be an act of religious
significance.").
172.
Id. at 68.
173.
688 So. 2d 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
174.
Id. at 946 (quoting the trial court's order).
175.
Id.
See supra discussion accompanying note 166.
176.
Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 528-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
177.
1996).
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what is 'religious"' and "interpret[ing] religious law or canons."l 78
The court also emphasized that "[n]o matter how one semantically
phrases [requiring a husband to give his wife a get], the order directly affect[s] the religious beliefs of the parties."' 7 9 Some commentators have agreed with this result, arguing that religious marriage contracts cannot be enforced for these very reasons. so
Courts have likewise refused to receive expert testimony on matMoreover, at least one court has
ters they considered religious.'
held that religious marriage contracts cannot be enforced at all,182
while still others have refused to enforce religious agreements
178. Id. at 528-29.
179. Id. at 529 ("In one's pursuit to comply with the creator's will one is
certainly engaged in religious activity.").
See infra Part VI; see also Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 216 (arguing
180.
that, among other problems, Islamic marriage contracts require making a determination of what terms are secular which "is impermissible because this determination by itself rests upon judicial evaluation of Islamic doctrinal issues");
Trumbull, supra note 168, at 612 ("This Note argues that the First Amendment
limits courts' ability to interpret contracts that contain Islamic legal terms or
stipulate that Islamic law governs the performance of the contract."). But see
Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 816-22, 839 (rejecting the argument that enforcement of Jewish marriage contracts is categorically unconstitutional); Warmflash,
supra note 9, at 253 (agreeing with the approach in Avitzur as constitutional).
See, e.g., Sieger v. Sieger, 747 N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (N.Y. App. Div.
181.
2002) ("To permit a party to introduce evidence or offer experts to dispute an
interpretition or application of religious requirements would place [the court] in
the inappropriate role of deciding whether religious law has been violated.
Here, the appellant seeks to do precisely that by relying on the affidavit of Rabbi
Rabinowitz to support his claim that the engagement contract required the husband to submit to arbitration before a rabbinical court." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
182.
See Pal v. Pal, 356 N.Y.S.2d 672, 672-73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)
(reversing a detailed order requiring the parties to appear before a beth din and
taking initial steps to convene the beth din because "Special Term had no authority to, in effect, convene a rabbinical tribunal"); cf Margulies v. Margulies,
344 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (refusing to uphold a contempt
order of imprisonment stemming from a husband's refusal to provide a get, but
upholding fines for the same because defendant did not appeal those orders); id.
at 485 (Nunez, J., dissenting) ("The original order directing the plaintiff to obtain the religious divorce being improper, the subsequent orders did not validate
it. I am certain my brethren would not enforce an order directing a litigant to go
to confession or to say six Our Fathers and four Hail Marys. I would reverse
and deny the motion to punish.").
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based on a hybrid blend of First Amendment concerns and statutory or judicial restraint concepts.' 8 3
Yet, even among these diverse approaches, there exists a
central line highlighting the possibility of resolution via neutral
principles of law. That is, by applying the well-known maxims of
contract law, courts may even adjudicate some matters that expressly invoke religious topics and concerns. For example, in
Goldman, the court expressly relied on contract principles to resolve the dispute.184 Similarly, in Akileh v. Elchahal, a Florida
appellate court looked to contract principles in analyzing an Islamic marriage contract.'5 However, the availability of neutral principles of contract law does not necessarily mean that all religious
agreements are enforceable. In Victor v. Victor, an Arizona appellate court refused to enforce "law of Moses and Israel" language,
regarding it as "a vague provision [that] ha[d] no specific terms
describing a mutual understanding that husband would secure a
Jewish divorce."' 8 6 Thus, the availability of neutral principles of
contract law suffices only to help avoid Establishment Clause violations; the agreements involved might still be deemed unenforceable under those neutral contract law principles.
Finally, courts have also frequently confronted the question
of how far into religious doctrine they can peer without violating
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. This ques183.
See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787, 788-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966) (holding that a trial judge "had no authority to order the appellee to
participate in a religious ceremony" but also stating that the court "ha[d] not
considered the appellee's contentions that requiring him to participate in a religious ceremony is a violation of his civil rights and the principle of the separation of church and state"); see also Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899, 901 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993) ("We find nothing in our statutes that gives the trial court authority
to order a husband to grant a religious divorce document based on equitable
considerations; the religious divorce is not germane to the civil dissolution.").
184.
In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 passim (Ill. App. Ct.
1990).
185.
Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248, 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) ("The trial court erred in finding that the wife gave no consideration in
this contract . .

.

. A subsequent difference as to the construction of the contract

does not affect the validity of the contract or indicate the minds of the parties did
not meet with respect thereto . ... The husband's subjective intent at the time he
entered into the agreement is not material in construing the contract.").
186.
Victor, 866 P.2d at 902.
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tion has arisen in a wide variety of contexts under both clauses of
the First Amendment, including cases addressing sexual assaults
byriests,18 religious defamation,' breaches of a fiduciary duty, and employment disputes,190 among others. Courts have often disagreed in determining when an inquiry is too great. For example, some have concluded that inquiry is unconstitutionally excessive when undertaken to develop a required "deep understanding of [religious] practices and traditions."'91 Additionally, courts
have held that "permit[ting] a party to introduce evidence or offer
experts to dispute an interpretation or application of religious requirements . . . place[s] fact-finders in the inappropriate role of

deciding whether religious law has been violated."l 92
On the opposite end of the spectrum, several courts have
held that traditional fact-finding inquiries are permissible.193 In
Elmora Hebrew Center, Inc. v. Fisher, the New Jersey Supreme
Court gave an example of such an inquiry. The court stated that
while "only a religious authority may be able to decide the scope
of duties of an 'orthodox Rabbi' . . . a civil court can certainly de-

termine the term of a contract or non-religious conditions of employment [for such a Rabbi]."l 9 4
Other courts have addressed inquiry into religious doctrine
itself. In McKelvey v. Pierce, the court held that "[t]he First
Amendment is not violated so long as resolution of a claim does
not require the court to choose between competing interpretations
of religious tenets or to interfere with a church's autonomy
rights."l 95 Setting out a similar rule in the context of the Free Ex187.
See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196
F.3d 409, 430 (2d Cir. 1999); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 353 (Fla. 2002);
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 847-48 (N.J. 2002).
188.
See, e.g., Abdelhak v. Jewish Press Inc., 985 A.2d 197, 204-05 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
189.
See, e.g., Lightman v. Flaum, 761 N.E.2d 1027 (N.Y. 2001).
190.
See, e.g., Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 72729 (N.J. 1991).
191.
See Abdelhak, 985 A.2d at 207-08.
192.
See Lightman, 761 N.E.2d at 1033.
The New Jersey courts have been particularly active in this category
193.
of cases.
194.
Elmora, 593 A.2d at 732.
195.
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 857 (N.J. 2002).
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ercise Clause, the Second Circuit compared its standard to the
hearsay rule:
To the extent that the jury did consider religious
teachings and tenets, moreover, it did so to determine not their validity but whether, as a matter of
fact, Martinelli's following of the teachings and belief in the tenets gave rise to a fiduciary relationship
between Martinelli and the Diocese. . . . The ob-

vious distinction between the proper use of religious
principles as facts and an improper decision that religious principles are true or false bears a certain
family resemblance to the more mundane rules of
hearsay. Evidence of a statement made out of court
may be inadmissible as hearsay to prove the truth of
the facts asserted in it, but may be admissible for
the non-hearsay purposes of proving that the statement was made or that other facts can be inferred
from the making of the statement. Similarly, the
proposition advanced by a particular religion that "a
bishop is like a 'shepherd' to the 'flock' of parishioners" cannot be considered by a jury to assess
its truth or validity or the extent of its divine approval or authority, but may be considered by the
same jury to determine the character of the relationship between a parishioner and his or her bishop.' 9 6
Echoing such sentiment, the New Jersey Supreme Court
suggested a similar rule in dicta in State v. J. G. by specifically noting that a court could "consider a proffer of evidence about religious practices that are relevant to the particular interaction between the cleric and penitent."l 97 It suggested:
To the extent that the proffer bears on the penitent's
objectively reasonable belief, the evidence should
not be foreclosed. Thus, for example, if relevant to
196.
Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d
409, 431 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1133 (N.J. 2010) (dicta).
197.
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determine a penitent's objectively reasonable belief,
it would not be improper to consider basic background information about the practice of going on
the Hajj, a pilgrimage to Mecca, so long as a court
did not attempt to decide whether that practice constituted a doctrinal tenet of Islam.' 9 8
Thus, while the First Amendment may bar "'extensive inquiry' into religious law and polity,"' 99 courts have come to a variety of conclusions when wrestling with religious document cases. 200 Although many courts have concluded that religious agreements can be enforced, not all have. Further, while some courts
have applied the neutral principles analysis from Jones, there is
meaningful variation in approach from case-to-case. Of course,
there is also continued disagreement on the exact border between a
permissible and an unconstitutional inquiry into religion.
These many cases arising in various contexts and pursuing
different analytical methods highlight the difficulty in adopting a
broad model for all religious documents. However, the development of a comprehensive framework remains both a possible and
worthwhile endeavor. In pursuing that task it is also valuable to
consider the analyses that other commentators have provided as to
interpreting and enforcing religious documents. It is that scholarship which Part V now considers.
V.

RELIGIOUS DOCUMENTS IN SECONDARY SOURCES

Religious documents have been the subject of occasional
comment in law reviews and other secondary sources, particularly
since Jones was decided in 1979. Just as there is variation in the
198. Id. (citation omitted)
199. Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 363 (Fla. 2002).
200.
See Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (considering
a ketubah); In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (addressing an Islamic marriage contract); Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808
(Del. Fam. Ct. 1992) (addressing a request to compel a get); Akileh v. Elchahal,
666 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (considering a sadaq); In re Marriage
of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (considering a ketubah). The
issue also arises outside the United States. See, e.g., Kaddoura v. Hammoud,
168 D.L.R. 4th 503 (Can. Ont. Ct. J. 1998) (addressing an Islamic marriage
contract).
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cases themselves, there is also diversity in the secondary sources
discussing those cases. Commentators have argued variously that
religious agreements generally cannot be enforced, that they can be
enforced only within narrow channels, or that they can and should
be broadly enforced. 20 1 The literature itself raises the analysis of
religious documents in a variety of settings, including church prop202
20th
the
the enforcement of Islamic marriage contracts,203
erty cases,22
2
0
4
agreements on a
enforcement of Jewish marriage contracts,
child's religious upbringing,205 employment law contexts, 2o and
agreements in other commercial contexts. 207 Some commentators
have endorsed a neutral principles of law approach for religious
contracts,208 while others have rejected such a model. 20 9 Still oth-

201.
Compare Blenkhorn, supra note 15 (arguing courts cannot enforce
religious agreements), with Trumbull, supra note 168, at 641 (arguing that
courts can enforce agreements but that "[i]n order to satisfy the competing interests of abiding by the First Amendment and providing a forum for relief, judges
should infer an arbitration clause into Islamic contracts in order to give full effect to the intent of the parties").
202. See, e.g., Daniel R. Suhr, On the Freedom of a Congregation: Legal
Considerationswhen Lutherans Look to Change DenominationalAffiliation, 13
TEX. REv. L. & POL. 365 (2009).

See, e.g., Siddiqui, supra note 15; Thompson & Yunus, supra note 17
203.
204.
See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 9.
205.
See Korzec, supra note 5; Jocelyn E. Strauber, Note, A Deal Is a
Deal: Antenuptial Agreements Regarding the Religious Upbringing of Children
Should Be Enforceable, 47 DUKE L.J. 971 (1998).
206.
See, e.g., David J. Overstreet, Note, Does the Bible Preempt Contract
Law?: A Critical Examination of JudicialReluctance to Adjudicate a Cleric's
Breach of Employment Contract Claim Against a Religious Organization, 81
MINN. L. REv. 263 (1996).

207.
Cf Grossman,supra note 2.
208. See Barshay, supra note 9, at 225, 252 ("Avitzur unquestionably established that the neutral principles of law approach to the enforcement of Jewish marriage contracts is the constitutionally appropriate and viable standard for
review."); Overstreet, supra note 206, at 292 ("By adopting a neutral principles
approach, courts can resolve the secular questions a contract claim raises and
still avoid any religious controversies over 'questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice."' (footnote omitted)); Siddiqui, supra note 15, at 650 (endorsing the contractual approach taken in Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002)); Strauber, supra note 205, at 1001 ("[A] court is not
constitutionally prohibited from resolving [a religious] dispute, if it can use neutral principles of contract law to do so.").
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ers have adopted a version of neutral principles but distinguished it
from the test in Jones.210 Similarly, commentators have disagreed
about which acts are religious and which are not, 2 1 1 and about how
far courts may inquire into religious matters when interpreting re21
By considering these points of disagreeligious agreements.212
ment, a stronger foundation for the model proposed in Part VI can
be developed.
As with the types of cases that have arisen in state and federal courts, two commonly discussed contexts within the literature
for religious documents are church property cases and cases concerning marriage contracts. Especially as to the latter, commentators have noted the various and unfortunate harms that have re-

209.
Cf Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 217 ("Moreover, civil courts cannot
apply neutral principles of law in deducing the couple's intent in a document
that is inherently religious. The obligation by the husband to pay the mahr is a
religious duty, addressed in the Shari'a and required by the Qur'an . . . .
[E]nforcement of a religious marriage contract necessarily requires reference to
substantive religious and ecclesiastical law, especially where there is a dispute
as to which of the numerous legal or religious schools apply." (footnotes omitted)).
210. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church PropertyDisputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 335, 357-58 (1986) (proposing
a "secular documents test" that "differs from the neutral principles test in that it .
. . refuses to consider provisions in church documents, such as church constitutions and canons, except . . . if the legal document incorporates the provision by

reference and it is not so general or ambiguous that its consideration defeats the
purpose of having a very narrow test").
Compare Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 17, at 383 (arguing that
211.
"even if there is judicial coercion to appear before a Beit Din or to grant a get,
the required act is secular and thus, outside the scope of the Establishment
Clause"), with Marc Feldman, Jewish Women and Secular Courts: Helping a
Jewish Woman Obtain a Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 153-55 (1990)

("[T]he giving of a get should be regarded as a religious act.") and Paul Finkelman, A Bad Marriage:Jewish Divorce and the FirstAmendment, 2 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 131, 165-66 (1995) ("If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck,
flies like a duck, swims like a duck, and walks like a duck, then it must be a
duck. When we apply the 'duck test' to the get, this 'duck' appears to be a religious one.").
212.
Compare Kent Greenawalt, Hands Offi Civil Court Involvement in
Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1843, 1888 (1998), and
Greenawalt, supranote 9, at 821, with Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 216.
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sulted from non-enforcement of religious agreements. 213In general, there is fairly broad agreement that it is desirable to enforce
religious contracts when it can be done without violating the First
Amendment or running afoul of basic principles of contract law.
This result is not surprising; just as religious parties have a right to
contract, courts should enforce those contracts where the law does
not otherwise prevent them from doing so. 2 14
There is, however, fairly broad disagreement on the details
of adjudication. One of the most divisive issues for commentators
has been the question of how far courts may inquire into religious
doctrine to interpret the agreement at issue. Some commentators,
such as Kent Greenawalt, have argued that generally "courts cannot both avoid resolving religious questions and give effect to all
the expectations of those deeply involved in religious organizations. ,,21 5 In other words, if a court is seeking to learn the parties'
intent manifested in a contract, then there is a necessary tension
between the court's looking into documents and matters evidencing that intent and the Establishment Clause's limit restricting
where the court may peer. To help resolve this conflict, Greenawalt argues that "[c]ourts should be able to look at any documents, so long as they can interpret crucial passages in the appropriate way."21 Greenawalt suggests that courts should be able to
interpret terms "even if they must make some reference to religious
law" to do so.217 Greenawalt notes importantly, however, that

213.
See Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 17, at 368-69; Blenkhorn, supra
note 15, at 189-90; Wexler, supra note 9, at 735-36; cf Ghada G. Qaisi, Note,
Religious Marriage Contracts: Judicial Enforcement of Mahr Agreements in
American Courts, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 67, 78 ("In effect, a Muslim wife is denied her right to contract in jurisdictions where mahr agreements are considered
profiteering by divorce.").
214.
See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871) ("Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations
for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract,
are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members
subject to its restraints.").
215.
Greenawalt, supra note 212, at 1905.
216. 1d. at 1888.
217.
Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 821.
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courts still may not resolve doctrinal disputes under this approach.2 1 8
On the other side of the debate, commentators have argued
that courts are broadly prohibited from inquiring into religious
doctrine. For example, in addressing Islamic marriage contracts,
Lindsey Blenkhorn argued that "even a determination of which
terms in an Islamic marriage contract are secular and which are not
is impermissible because this determination by itself rests upon
judicial evaluation of Islamic doctrinal issues." 219 Additionally,
Charles Trumbull has suggested that "[c]ourts may not enforce
religious contracts when the contracting parties disagree on the
meaning of a religious term, the application of religious law, or an
issue of religious doctrine." 220 Some commentators have even
concluded that "Smith [via its prohibition on judicial inquiry into
the centrality of a religious belief within the religion] confirms that
the prohibition against judicial examination of religious questions
articulated in the church property cases should be understood to be
broad and absolute." 22 1
This broad reading, however, is troubling as it threatens to
render documents with any religious language nonjusticiable. Because parties often enter into contracts to address matters of importance to them and religious matters are obviously important to religious entities, contracts between religious individuals or entities
will often invoke religious language. Thus, a broad prohibition on
inquiry and analysis of religious agreements would, by definition,
undermine the contract rights of religious bodies. That result is
See, e.g., 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 83, at 274, 275 ("Civil deter218.
mination of debatable issues of religious law is generally unacceptable ... [b]ut
recognition of religious law does not by itself render [] civil involvements unconstitutional.").
219.
See Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 216; see also Elizabeth R. Lieberman, Note, Avitzur v. Avitzur: The Constitutional Implications of Judicially
Enforcing Religious Agreements, 33 CATHi. U. L. REv. 219, 242 (1983) (arguing
that Avitzur "failed to recognize that determinations regarding the legal significance of a religious document's provisions violate constitutional principles protecting against excessive entanglement by the government in religious doctrine").
220.
See Trumbull, supranote 168, at 624-25.
221.
Goldstein, supra note 119, at 519. Notably, Goldstein also argues
that such a rule is undesirable and problematic.
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undesirable to the extent that it is avoidable within the confines of
the Establishment Clause.
In response, some commentators have suggested that the
prohibition into inquiry should distinguish between deciding doctrinal questions-i.e., courts deciding what is "true" and what is
"false" about religious beliefs objectively-and making factual
observations-i.e., courts deciding what is believed to be true by
adherents as a matter of proof. For example, Jared Goldstein explained the distinction, stating:
[A] court may not determine whether food actually
is ritually fit for consumption according to God's
laws any more than it may determine whether Devil's Tower actually is a sacred site, but a court may
constitutionally determine whether Jews believe the
food to be kosher just as it could determine whether
the Cheyenne people consider Devil's Tower to be
sacred.
Greenawalt has similarly argued:
Suppose that someone sold crosses with the claim,
"Personally Blessed by the Pope." The state may
properly prevent such fraud. No doubt, some
claims of religious fraud present grave problems.
Officials cannot assess the truth of essentially religious claims, and they should ordinarily not determine the sincerity of people who make claims about
their own religious experiences, such as "God has
revealed himself to me." But a simple determination that the Pope did not bless particular crosses
223
does not raise such problems .
Under these approaches, Goldstein has argued that "the
resolution of Free Exercise Clause cases, like many others, depends on a court's determination of the content of religious beliefs
and practices. Such determinations do not exceed judicial compe222.
223.

Id. at 548.
Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 790 (footnote omitted).
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tence and cannot plausibly be considered to be prohibited by the
Constitution." 224 These commentators seem to be correct. 225In
other words, while there are some impermissible determinations
and forbidden inquiries into religious matters, the prohibition is not
without bounds. Courts may look-they may make observations
about what is or was believed-but courts may not touch-they
may not resolve disputes over or issue declarations regarding what
is a true or false belief.226 Similarly, a court could determine
whether a particular person's stated religious belief or intent was
sincerely held or was instead a fagade to frustrate judicial enforcement of terms now unfavorable to that party.22 7 The model proposed in Part VI draws upon these distinctions.
Turning to the matter of coercion, commentators generally
agree that "[t]he state should not compel intrinsically religious
acts, even if people have agreed to perform them." 228 After all, "if
the First Amendment means anything, it means that the state may
not force someone to subject himself or herself to religious authori-

224. Goldstein, supra note 119, at 551.
225. Smith's prohibition on determining whether a belief is "central" to a
religion does not indicate otherwise. The prohibition in Smith is more analogous
to resolving a doctrinal dispute than it is to a basic fact-finding inquiry. This
Article does not dispute that courts cannot resolve doctrinal disputes.
226.
Or as another commentator has phrased it, "on religious matters,
courts may not tell people what they should do or believe, but they may determine, in the sense of making factual findings, what beliefs people hold and what
practices they engage in." Goldstein, supra note 119, at 501. Stated more expansively, "The First Amendment is not violated so long as resolution of a claim
does not require the court to choose between competing interpretations of religious tenets or to interfere with a church's autonomy rights." McKelvey v.
Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 857 (N.J. 2002).
For a commentator arguing such "sincerely held" inquiries are per227.
missible, see Breitowitz, supra note 15, at 395-96 ("While no court may determine the ultimate truth or validity of a religious belief, the court may certainly
conduct an inquiry into whether the alleged 'religious' objections are sincerely
held, as is routinely done in cases of conscientious objectors to military service."
(footnote omitted)).
228.
Greenawalt, supra note 9 at 817; see also Finkelman, supra note 211,
at 147 (responding to Breitowitz's article); cf Bleich, supra note 32, at 277 ("It
must be recognized that any attempt to involve secular courts in assuring that the
parties to a divorce action will also cooperate in the execution of a religious
divorce poses a serious constitutional problem.").
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ties." 229 This is an important component of both existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence and of the model adopted in Part VI
of this Article. Nevertheless, as was discussed previously, there is
broad disagreement on which actions are religious and which are
not. Consider the following perspective:
Enforcement [of a ketubah] could be construed as
judicial coercion of participation in religion, in violation of Lee. Such a conclusion would be tenuous, however, as courts would be simply enforcing an agreement to which the parties themselves
have freely bargained. They are not required to take
a position on religious questions. This position has
the support of many scholars, who have argued that
granting a get is not a "religious" act, but rather a
contractual one. Therefore, even if there is judicial
coercion to appear before a Beit Din or to grant a
get, the required act is secular and thus, outside the
scope of the Establishment Clause. 230
On the other side of the spectrum, commentators have argued that
simply appearing before a religious tribunal for a religious divorce
is itself a religious act: "any appearance before a religious tribunal
for the purpose of exercising a religious divorce is per se religious
in nature. There is no secular justification for such a divorce since
a civil divorce legally terminates the marriage."231 Moreover, in
light of the difficulties in both compelling a religious divorce and
in granting a secular divorce without compelling a religious counterpart, other commentators have advised that courts should "do
nothing" and thereby "remain neutral."2 3 2 Under Lee and its prog229.
Finkelman, supra note 211, at 147 (responding to Breitowitz's article).
230.
Greenberg-Kobrin, supra note 17, at 383 (footnotes omitted) ("Even
if the agreement specifies a standing Beit Din, under Lynch and Lee, sending the
parties to a religious court may be considered endorsement or coercion.").
231.
See Lawrence C. Marshall, Comment, The Religion Clauses and
Compelled Religious Divorces: A Study in Marital and ConstitutionalSeparations, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 204, 219 (1985).
232.
Bleich, supra note 32, at 281-82 ("The court need not direct the husband to issue a get; but it should not entertain his petition for divorce unless he
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eny, coercion of a religious task is forbidden, and thus, it is essential for a court adjudicating religious agreements to first conclude
whether the act involved is religious.
Yet, whether or not courts deem a given act to be religious,
must
always make more fundamental determinations concourts
cerning the existence of contractual agreements. Indeed, before
any religious agreement can be enforced, a court must consider
whether it was intended as a contract at all.2 33 In the scholarly
community, many commentators refuse to find religious documents as deserving of contractual status. Paul Finkelman has argued that "[i]t is a peculiar notion that a valid and binding contract
is created when parties sign a ritualistic document, which they are
incapable of either reading or understanding, and which no one
reads to them or translates for them." 234 Moreover, because of certain religious beliefs or circumstances that surround the signing of
religious agreements-such as cultural pressures and family members negotiating the terms of the contract for the signee-some
have suggested that many parties sign religious documents under
duress or without complete knowledge of the agreement.235 Similarly, in reviewing the characteristics of Jewish marriage contracts,
Marc Feldman noted the following:
The ketubah contains exclusively boilerplate language and is, therefore, not reflective of the parties'
intentions and expectations; it is not a contract negotiated at arm's length. Moreover, the reference to
the bet din, while intended to deal with the event of
divorce, does not explicitly mention dissolution, and
so may not put a husband on notice of its intended
has already removed any existing impediment to remarriage by his spouse or
unless he undertakes to do so.").
See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 211, at 147-48; cf Carol Weisbrod,
233.
Universals and Particulars:A Comment on Women's Human Rights and Religious MarriageContracts, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 77, 89 (1999)
(questioning, in the context of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, whether religious marriage agreements are contractual agreements).
Finkelman, supra note 211, at 148.
234.
See, e.g., Blenkhom, supra note 15, at 222-23 (suggesting that mahr
235.
agreements might often be signed under "duress or undue influence by the wali
or some other cultural force").
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effect. The ketubah is also signed amidst a day of
religious ceremonies and celebrations; it could be
regarded as just part of the wedding celebration,
with the parties not understanding its true
significance.2 3 6
These commentators are correct in noting the difficulties in determining whether a religious agreement is enforceable as a contract
and in inquiring into the circumstances surrounding the agreement's creation. These are questions that courts cannot ignore and
that must be included in the model proposed in Part VI.
In summary, while it is clear that commentators have fallen
on many sides of the religious document debate, the diversity of
discussion empowers Part VI's framing of an analytical approach.
In particular, the debate highlights problems that courts must be
particularly aware of: (a) whether the document was ever intended
to be a contract, (b) how far courts may inquire into religious doctrine, (c) whether enforcement of the agreement requires coercing a
religious act, and (d) whether the document is invalid under principles of contract law. As each of these questions is important, the
Article's proposed model takes each into account. It is to that
model that the discussion now turns.
VI. INTERPRETING AND ENFORCING RELIGIOUS DOCUMENTS

Before outlining a proper framework for interpreting religious documents, it should be re-emphasized that religious individuals and groups have just as much right to have their agreements enforced-when possible-as any other contracting party. 237
Moreover, when a court fails to enforce a contract, it fails to protect one or both parties' expectations, thereby exposing the parties

236.
Feldman, supra note 211, at 147-48; see also Marshall, supra note
231, at 225 n.98 (discussing the ketubah at issue in Avitzur and whether it was a
contract or not).
237.
See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871) ("Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations
for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract,
are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members
subject to its restraints.").
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to un-bargained for consequences.238 At times, these consequences
can be severe. For example, parties could be forced into expensive
and unexpected litigation if an arbitration clause involving a religious tribunal is not enforced, and similarly, a divorcing couple
might have its post-marital plans disrupted if their marriage contract references religious law. In another scenario, a church or other religious group might have its only property taken away if religious language describing the property's reversion status is denied
interpretation.239 However, even in the face of such unfortunate
results, the First Amendment draws some lines that cannot be
crossed. Some religious agreements will simply be unenforceable.
As Justice Souter remarked, "[C]onstitutional lines have to be
drawn, and on one side of every one of them is an otherwise sympathetic case that provokes impatience with the Constitution and
with the line. But constitutional lines are the price of constitutional
government."240 In keeping with such forethought, the model below simply seeks to help courts locate those constitutional lines
and chart a path of analysis and enforcement for those religious
documents that are enforceable.
A. A Four-StepProposedAnalysis
The proposed model for interpreting religious documents
consists of four steps, neatly dividing the analysis for ease of de238.

See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 10, at 1383 ("The price of [non-

enforcement] .

.

. is denying church members ordinarily available remedies,

solely on account of the religious nature of the organization in which the ...
contract .. . dispute arose. When a court refuses to adjudicate church disputes, it
may sacrifice members' contractual interests and religious freedom."); see also
id. at 1402-05 (discussing why religious agreements should be enforced).
239.
It is worth noting that harms could also result from enforcement of a
religious contract. It is not an unfair response to state that many of the negative
consequences just described stem not from any failure of the judicial system, but
instead from the personal religious beliefs of the parties. Cf Finkelman, supra
note 211, at 134 ("The problem faced by the agunah is not one of civil law or
even the interaction of civil law with religious law. The problem stems from
Jewish law, which does not allow a woman to divorce her husband and does not
allow a bait din to compel a Jewish man to divorce his wife, or to deliver a get
to her, even if he has abandoned her.").
240.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 254 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting)).
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scription and discussion. Nevertheless, it is not strictly necessary
for a court to proceed from each stage in exact numerical succession. Instead, it is critical that the court keep all of the steps in
mind during each stage.
1. Step One: Is There a Contract?
The first task for the court is to determine what the document is, and thus, the court's basic aim is to determine whether any
contract exists in a case where the parties allege that a religious
document constitutes one. It should be noted that this element of
the analysis turns not on constitutional principles but rather on the
law of contracts. Hence, the crux of the court's initial inquiry is
the following: did the parties intend for this agreement to be a
contract,241 or did the parties intend for it to be enforced solely by
ecclesiastical courts or perhaps not at all because they viewed it as
simply art or poetry? 24 2 If the document was created as only art or
poetry, or as something purely symbolic and not symbolizing an
agreement to ideas and terms, the court could conclude it is not a
contract and thus not enforce its terms. If, however, it is found that
a contract is present, the court advances forward in the remaining
three steps of the analysis. Throughout the process, the court
should apply contract principles, and if at any point the agreement
fails on such grounds-such as due to a lack of consideration or
vagueness-the maxims of contract law and not constitutional law
preclude enforcement.
2. Step Two: What Relief Is Sought?
The next task set before a court asked to enforce a religious
contract is to identify the relief requested. Because the nature of
the relief sought will significantly impact which portions of the
religious agreement must be interpreted, identifying the relief is
essential. For example, imagine that a Muslim wife is requesting
the court to compel payment of a mahr by her husband, and yet,
upon review, suppose the court observes that the nikah has a sepa241.
242.
App. Ct.
marriage

See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 231 (raising this question).
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (111.
1990) (involving a husband who argued that he viewed their religious
contract merely as art or poetry).
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rate section in which the parties agreed to pray together after any
marital dissolution. If the court concludes that enforcing the separate portion of the nikah requiring prayer is unconstitutional-and
it surely is243-but the parties are not calling on the court to enforce that portion, then the invalidity of the prayer provision is not
necessarily dispositive for the mahr provision. In such a situation,
the court should conduct a traditional severability analysis and, if
severable, strike the post-dissolution prayer provision. By concentrating on the provisions relevant to the requested relief, the court
will place the case in the proper framework and avoid dismissing
cases because they contain some non-relevant provision that itself
could not be constitutionally enforced. Focusing on the requested
relief is also important as it will limit any inquiry into religious
law.
3. Step Three: Interpretation Limits
Once the court has identified the relief requested, it must
interpret the provisions related to that relief. This stage does not
neatly follow the prior stage because it will often be necessary in
determining the requested relief-step two-to interpret the provisions from which that relief allegedly will derive-step three. In
other words, it might be necessary to interpret certain terms in the
agreement in order to determine what the requested relief entails.
In interpreting the provisions from which relief derives,
there are two main possibilities. The first possibility is that the
terms of the provisions are secular. For example, two parties
might have contracted in non-religious terms for the provision of
particular food at a religious event. If the terms are purely secular,
then the court can simply read them directly. In such a circumstance, the court is done with this stage of the analysis and proceeds
to the fourth and final step. For example, a contract stating that
"all disputes between the parties will be submitted to arbitration by
the Centre for Christian Dispute Resolution (CCDR), located at [a
certain place]" is a provision that, at least in language, is secular.
243. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). In both cases, subtly coercing individuals
to pray was unconstitutional. A direct coercion from a court would be an even
stronger violation than in these two cases.
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For such a provision, the court can proceed to the next stage of the
analysis.
The second possibility is that the terms in the provisions relevant to the requested relief are partially or wholly religious. For
example, if the parties contracted that "only food that is Kosher
under [a particular Jewish school's definition of that term] shall be
served," then the court is faced with the question of what a particular religious entity believed a term to mean. Similarly, a provision
stating that "the law of Moses and Israel" shall apply is specifically
referring to religious law. This Article argues that such terms are
often unenforceable under the Court's current jurisprudence to the
extent they require resolving doctrinal disputes or making normative judgments.244 Further, although some courts have done so,245
inquiring into what "the law of Moses and Israel" requires in a given contract is at best dangerously close to the "extensive inquiry by
civil courts into religious law and polity" that Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese forbids.246 After all, determining something as
expansive as what "the law of Moses and Israel" requires is likely
to involve searching deeply into religious doctrine, as the term facially has no transparent meaning. Instead, its meaning comes only from all of the relevant portions of Moses's and Israel's law.
Courts encountering such religious terms or concepts in the provisions relevant to relief must therefore proceed carefully. It is important, however, that a court not simply abandon ship when faced
with religious language and assume that the possibility of some
interpretation automatically precludes resolution of the case. The
court has multiple potential tools to avoid that result.
If the contract provision at issue involves religious language requiring some inquiry into religious law, the court should
take a two-pronged approach. First, it should focus as much as
possible on inquiring not into what religious law provides but in244.
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
245.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1018 (upholding
the enforcement of a Jewish marriage contract that provided that the "law of
Moses and Israel" governed the marriage).
246.
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709; see also id. at 723
("The constitutional provisions of the American-Canadian Diocese were not so
express that the civil courts could enforce them without engaging in a searching
and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.").
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stead into what the parties to the contract intended that provisione.g., "the law of Moses and Israel" or "Kosher"-to mean. 247 As
in Goldman, it may be the case that one of the parties will provide
personal, uncontradicted testimony establishing what the parties
had in mind when they agreed to that provision. 24 8 If the parties do
so, the court might be able to determine what the parties intended
the religious term to mean without approaching the outer boundaries of permissible inquiry. For example, the parties might introduce materials they reviewed in planning the event that contain
detailed definitions of "Kosher." In such an instance, the court
could strive to identify what the parties intended the term in their
contract to mean without (a) declaring what the Jewish religious
school actually believed "Kosher" meant, (b) resolving any doctrinal disputes about what "Kosher" as a religious term includes, or
(c) extensively searching religious law itself. By focusing on the
parties' intentions, the court can limit inquiry into religious doctrine, practice, or polity, and perhaps even avoid such inquiry
entirely.
The second prong of a court's approach in interpreting religious terms arises if the first prong-looking to the parties' intentions-does not alone reveal the meaning of the religious term.
Conceptually, the second prong is straightforward: to the extent
that the court must inquire into religious law, it must limit its inOne possible result of this second stage of the analysis-interpreting
247.
the relevant provisions of the agreement-is that in investigating what the parties intended the terms of the contract to mean, the court will conclude that there
was no meeting of the minds on the relevant term. To the extent that this result
is problematic, that problem is a necessary result of treating the document at
issue as a contract and applying contract principles to it. As the Supreme Court
stated in PresbyterianChurch v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church,
and repeated in Jones v. Wolf "States, religious organizations, and individuals
must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the
civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions." Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
248.
It is debatable whether the wife in Goldman actually succeeded at this
task, though on balance given the lack of contradictory evidence the husband
apparently introduced, it seems that Goldman reached an accurate conclusion.
Further, in Goldman some of the evidence the wife introduced required the court
to consider religious law. In re Marriageof Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1018-20.
Thus, Goldman is not a pure example of the first prong of this stage of the analysis.
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quiry. While there are no bright-line rules in the case law for this
portion of the analysis, it is true that the further a court restricts its
inquiry, the less accurately it might determine the true intent behind the provision. 249 Thus, on one hand, it is clear that some inquiry is necessarily permissible. In Jones, the Court specifically
noted,
[T]here may be cases where the [document at issue]
incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property. If in such a
case the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the
resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative
ecclesiastical body.2 50
The Court did not conclude, in this portion of Jones, that a court
cannot inquire into religious concepts when a religious document
incorporates them. Rather, it only foreclosed resolving doctrinal
disputes. In addition, Jones did not state that the presence of such
religious concepts tainted the entire interpretive process. Instead,
the framework of Jones clearly suggested that some inquiry is constitutionally permissible. 251
The Court's recent cases under Lemon also support the
conclusion that basic fact-finding inquiries are constitutional insofar as they do not resolve doctrinal disputes. Indeed, because the
Court itself has engaged in such basic fact-finding, this Article argues that basic religious inquiry is permissible. Moreover, once a
court has determined what a relevant religious term means in the
context of a document, the court should proceed to the fourth and
final stage of the model. On the other hand, if a court cannot de249.
See, e.g., 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 102, at 280 ("As the examination allowed under neutral principles becomes more restrictive, a court's actual
inquiry will diverge further from a full inquiry about intent.").
250.
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (citing SerbianE. Orthodox

Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709).
251.
As was noted previously, a court also must undertake some inquiry
into religious law and polity to determine which hierarchical court it should
defer to. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 83, at 264 & n.61; cf Gen. Council of
Fin. & Admin. v. Cal. Super. Ct., 439 U.S. 1369, 1372-74 (1978).
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termine the meaning of a term after engaging in religious inquiry,
the document at issue likely cannot be given full effect by the civil
court. 52

Despite the permissibility of religious inquiry, it is worth
noting again that a court must not resolve any doctrinal disputes if
253
For example, suppose that a nikah
the inquiry is to be valid.
provision states that a wife may divorce her husband for a number
of specified reasons (e.g., physical abuse, adultery) but also states
that she may divorce him "for other reasons recognized by Shari'a." Shari'a is the divine law of Islam, and there are different
schools of Islamic thought on what Shari'a entails, 254 each of
which could have its own theories on when Shari'a permits a wife
to divorce her husband. In light of such potential diversity, a court
cannot authoritatively declare which school is correct in its interpretation of what Shari'arequires. Doing so would have a primary
effect that advances the religious views of that school and inhibits
the religious views of other schools, thereby failing the second
prong of Lemon and suggesting an Establishment Clause violation. 25 A court would also be purporting to resolve a doctrinal
dispute, a task forbidden in Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Church.256
Instead, a court facing such a doctrinal dispute should seek
only to determine what the parties intended to be "other reasons
recognized by Shari'a." By determining only what the parties intended this term to mean, the court avoids resolving the doctrinal
dispute (in the broader context of Islam) and instead resolves only
the parties' dispute (in the narrow context of this one agreeSome commentators have suggested that such contracts could still be
252.
enforced by referring them to a religious tribunal to determine the meaning of a
term. See, e.g., Trumbull, supra note 168, at 641-42.
253.
See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
254.
See, e.g., Blenkhorn, supra note 15, at 192 n.15 ("There are four main
legal schools or sects within Islam: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. It
should be stressed that there are many variations within the four schools as to
interpretations and implementation of the Qur'an, and thus, it is difficult to generalize across many regions, tribes, and countries."); see also Siddiqui, supra
note 15, at 644-45.
255.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
256.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1 Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
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ment).2 57 It may be that the parties cannot produce evidence establishing what they intended, or it may be that the evidence is too
indefinite and that the contract should fail under a vagueness analysis. On the other hand, it may be that, as in Odatalla v. Odatalla
and Goldman, the parties will be able to provide testimony and
other evidence indicating what the parties' intentions were under
the agreement.258 Again, if the parties cannot establish their intent,
the contract might be unenforceable. 259 While unfortunate, that
result is a contractual failing, and the court should not "mak[e] a
contract for the parties." 260 If, however, the parties can supply evidence of intent, the court can avoid the constitutional prohibition
on resolving doctrinal disputes by focusing instead on resolving
the dispute over what the parties intended.

See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 10, at 1416 ("What the courts needed to
257.
decide in the synagogue cases was not the essence of Judaism, an unconstitutional if not impossible task, but rather the essence of the grantor's intent."); cf
Grossman, supra note 2, at 207 ("In the [arbitration] context, the reviewing
court is searching only for an understanding of what the parties agreed to when
they submitted a dispute before the religious tribunal. A court would not be
making a determination of religious doctrine if it used extrinsic evidence, like
testimony from the tribunal itself, family members, or whomever, that a party
had a certain interpretation in mind. Thus, there is no pronouncement that applies across a particular religion. Moreover, even in the hard cases where a religious term is subject to wide dispute and susceptible to many interpretations
within a particular religion, the courts may be able to take that as evidence that
no valid agreement existed in the first place. In no sense does this type of review approximate a judicial determination of religious doctrine." (footnotes
omitted)).
See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (Ill. App. Ct.
258.
1990); Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see
also Ellman, supra note 10, at 1420 ("Vagueness, however, is not a problem
peculiar to church disputes; modem adjudications routinely look to extrinsic
evidence to give vague terms the meaning necessary to decide a conflict.").
See, e.g., Mayer-Kolker v. Kolker, 819 A.2d 17, 21 (N.J. Super. Ct.
259.
App. Div. 2003) ("Plaintiff has not established the effect of this particular ketubah nor the mandate of Mosaic law, if applicable. Without such a record we
lack the necessary factual context to determine whether a New Jersey court has
power to compel cooperation in obtaining a get.").
260. In re Marriageof Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1026 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Despite the general validity of the dissent's point in this regard, it is not
clear that the majority in Goldman in fact made a contract for the parties.
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4. Step Four: Coercion?
Once the court has identified the type of document
present-stage one-identified the requested relief-stage twoand interpreted the provisions relevant to granting or denying relief-stage three-the court proceeds to the final stage of analyzing the agreement: determining if granting the relief itself is constitutional. In this stage, the court should focus on avoiding coercing religious exercises even if the document at issue is otherwise
interpretable. 261 If the requested relief requires compelling a party
to engage in a religious exercise, the relief simply cannot be
granted. However, the parties are not the sole arbiters of what is
religious. Likewise, unrefuted expert testimony from religious
experts that an act is or is not religious would not itself necessitate
a similar finding by the judge. The court must make that determination itself, just as it determines in any First Amendment case
whether the beliefs or actions at hand are "religious" or not.
Thus, if an agreement calls for a husband to give to his wife
a get, the court must determine if giving a get is a religious act. In
doing so, it faces the same limitations discussed in the prior stages
of this analysis. It may not delve too deeply into religious law, and
it may not resolve any doctrinal disputes. Further, the court cannot
compel performance of a religious act even if the contract calls for
such. Contrary to what some courts and commentators have concluded, the fact that a party has previously agreed to perform a religious act should not cause a court to conclude that the limitations
of the Establishment Clause simply disappear or are waived.2 62
Cf Goldstein, supra note 119, at 551 ("A court's authority to under261.
take fact-finding into positive questions about religion is thus a distinct question
from its authority to impose remedies that may have the effect of inhibiting or
promoting the exercise of religion.").
262. As other commentators have noted, the Establishment Clause appears
to be a structural limitation on the government which an individual may not
remove the burden of from the government. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a StructuralRestraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L
REv. 1, 3 (1998) ("While individual rights can be waived, structural restraints
cannot."); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 123, 153-54 (2008) ("The goals
and benefits of the Establishment Clause are primarily social and structural, not
individual. As such, individuals may not choose to waive the protections of the
Establishment Clause."). Yuracko also notes Lawrence Tribe's argument that
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Finally, even if the court cannot specifically enforce the
contract, it might still be able to protect the parties' interests by
other means. For example, the court might recognize that, though
it could not order the performance of a contracted-for religious act,
it could still recognize the non-performance as a contractual matter
and refuse to give the corresponding provisions of the nonperforming party's contract effect. 26 3 Or, if one party breached a
contract requiring performance of a religious act-perhaps the
singing of a sacred hymn at an event in exchange for a sum of
money-the court should still be able to order the refund of the
money paid for the unperformed act. In doing so, however, the
court should not seek to use monetary or other sanctions as an indirect mechanism for forcing performance of the religious act. Rather, the court must merely endeavor to protect the interests created
by the contract at issue. In summary, if the court reaches the
fourth stage of the model and concludes that it can enforce the
agreement without compelling any religious exercise and that its
order will not otherwise violate the First Amendment, then the religious document can constitutionally be given legal effect.

"'it is plain that a church or church-related school could not, for example,
"waive" the right to avoid intrusive governmental entanglement in order to receive direct monetary aid from the public treasury."' See id. at 154 n.150 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Commentary, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99
HARV. L. REv. 330, 333 n.14 (1985)).
But notably some judges have concluded that Establishment Clause
issues are at times effectively waived for procedural reasons. See, e.g., Fleischer
v. Fleischer, 586 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an
Establishment Clause argument was waived on appeal because it was not presented at the trial level and did not, under the facts of the case, rise to the level
of fundamental error); cf Warner v. Orange Cnty. Dept. of Probation, 115 F.3d
1068, 1077 (2d Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., dissenting) (arguing that consent to and
failure to raise an alleged Establishment Clause violation was a waiver of the
claim for damages suffered as a result of said violation).
263.
Cf Menorah Chapels at Millburn v. Needle, 899 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) ("Although the services at issue may be required
under the tenets of the orthodox Jewish faith [and therefore could not be
coerced], the dispute does not concern the manner in which they were performed, but solely whether they were performed at all-a non-doctrinal matter.").
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B. Scope ofProposedAnalysis
The discussion surrounding this four-stage analysis has not
addressed every possible permutation of a religious agreement, nor
has it raised every nuance that courts will confront in interpreting
religious contracts. Some cases will involve additional complexities because the parties allege that interpretation or enforcement of
the document will cause Free Exercise Clause or expressive association violations.264 Other cases might involve documents perSeparate discussions of expressive association and the Free Exercise
264.
Clause are beyond the scope of this Article. Courts confronting claims under the
Free Exercise Clause should begin with the two cases currently governing much
of the jurisprudence: Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-81
(1990), and Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993). Under Smith, neutral laws of general applicability are constitutional
despite incidentally burdening an individual's exercise of religion. See Church
ofLukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531 (discussing Smith); Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
880-81. However, if the law is not in fact neutral or of general applicability but
instead is directed at a particular religious group, then Smith does not apply.
Instead, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye applies and requires that the government
demonstrate the constitutionality of the action in question. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531-32. To do so, the government must prove
that it has a compelling interest for the action and that the action is narrowlytailored to serve that compelling interest. Id.
Likely, Smith will govern interpretation of a given religious contract,
not Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye. In applying the Jones neutral principles of
law approach, a court will necessarily be applying general legal concepts to
resolve the dispute at hand. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979). The
entire premise of the Jones analysis is that it looks to legal principles that apply
broadly, and therefore, courts applying Jones should fit under Smith's "law of
general applicability" requirement. Cf Meghaan Cecilia McElroy, Note, Possession Is Nine Tenths of the Law: But Who Really Owns a Church'sProperty in
the Wake of a Religious Split Within a HierarchicalChurch?, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 311, 337-38 (2008) ("The key component of the Smith test is the requirement that the law be neutral and of general applicability. This requirement
goes hand-in-hand with the requirement in Jones that courts apply neutral principles of law." (footnote omitted)). For example, courts applying Jones to religious contracts would, if relying on contract principles, fall under Smith's "valid
and neutral law" requirement because general contract law axioms do not specifically target religion. Even if a court is applying contract law to address what is
allegedly a religious harm-such as an agunah seeking referral to a beth din to
remedy her inability to remarry within her faith-the legal principles applied are
purely neutral, generally applicable contract principles. Accordingly, while
religious document cases are somewhat different in form than Smith, they fit
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taining to the internal structure of the church-potentially invoking
the church autonomy doctrine--or to leaders of the religious
group-potentially invoking the ministerial exception doctrine. 26 5
Still other cases might never find their way before secular courts if
the parties decide to pursue them in religious tribunals.266
However, for those cases that do reach secular courts, the
model proposed in this Article can help guide courts through a
wide variety of religious document cases. Courts heeding the limitations set forth by the Supreme Court, described in Part III of this
Article, and courts reviewing the on-point state and federal jurisprudence and legal commentary, discussed in Parts IV and V, will
squarely within Smith's "valid and neutral law of general applicability" standard, and thus Smith and Lukumi should be of little restricting force for courts in
religious document cases. On the other hand, if a party is alleging that his or her
free exercise rights are being violated because the court is coercing that party to
engage in a religious act in fulfilling the contract then a valid free exercise claim
has likely been made-and a prohibition on the court ordering performance of
said act arises. In this limited instance, the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause operate in tandem to bar the court coercing performance of the
religious act.
See Brady, supra note 105, at 1636 (arguing for a broad church au265.
tonomy doctrine founded in part on Smith); Laycock, supra note 87, at 1392;
Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Construction and Application of Church Autonomy Doctrine, 123 A.L.R.5th 385 (2004); cf Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) ("Freedom to select the clergy ... must now be
said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of
religion against state interference."). But see McClure v. The Salvation Army,
460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1972) (discussing the ministerial exception);
Laura S. Underkuffler, Commentary, Thoughts on Smith and Religious-Group
Autonomy, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1773, 1776-81 (2004) (arguing that Smith applies to and contradicts the church autonomy doctrine).
Cf Ginnine Fried, Comment, The Collision of Church and State: A
266.
Primerto Beth Din Arbitrationand the New York Secular Courts, 31 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 633, 637 (2004) (observing that "choosing a secular court despite the
availability of a Jewish court undermines the authority of Jewish law and the
rabbinical courts, and what follows is the inference that the beth din lacks either
the capability or sophistication to adjudicate an issue according to halacha. The
great rabbinical authority Maimonedes captured this sentiment when he wrote
that a Jew who voluntarily brings his case to secular court instead of utilizing the
beth din has behaved 'as if he had raised his hand against the Torah.' Today,
modem Jewish authorities still hold that '[a] central principle of halacha is that
disputes between Jews should be adjudicated in duly-constituted rabbinical
courts."').
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have at the ready even further guidance. Moreover, by focusing on
the intentions of the parties at the micro-scale-as opposed to the
broader religious issues at the macro-scale-courts may employ
neutral principles of law to enforce some of even the most expressly religious agreements. Not all agreements will be enforceable, as
non-enforcement will derive from instances of contractual failures,
First Amendment prohibitions, or both. However, when possible,
religious documents should be enforced. Religious parties are just
like any other party that enters into agreements with expectations,
and accordingly, those expectations are deserving of legal
protection.
VII. CONCLUSION

While acknowledging that religious documents pose a
number of constitutional concerns, this Article has suggested that
religious documents very often can, and should, be enforced using
neutral principles of law. Yet, while the analysis proposed herein
is straightforward, it is not simple. Simplicity is rarely a friend of
the nuanced Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court has specifically eschewed a universal analysis for all Establishment cases
because such simplicity would fail to capture the relevant distinctions of the Clause. Another commentator has already welldescribed the dangers of simplicity in this regard:
The aspiration for simple approaches is either deluded or badly misguided. It is deluded if a proponent believes simple approaches will yield results
sensitive to the nuances of our religious and social
life. It is misguided if a proponent recognizes the
Procrustean quality of simple approaches, but thinks
their clarity and determinacy are worth the price of

unhappy outcomes. 267
To some degree, therefore, results under the Establishment
Clause for religious agreements are not certain. Ultimately, parties
wishing to have their expectations protected will do better to draft
a separate, secular agreement that is devoid of religious terms, that
267.

Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 843.
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complies with contractual principles, and that does not require performance of religious acts. However, this advice has already been
suggested, 26 8 and religious documents still flourish. Given their
continued existence, the above model proposes an analysis for protecting the expectations of religious parties in those documents
when possible. While not all religious agreements will be enforceable, some will be. Hopefully, the proposed model will assist
courts in identifying and enforcing those documents that do not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause.

268.

See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 600 n.2 (1979).

